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Constructivism	  about	  reasons	  (henceforth	  constructivism)	  is	  a	  label	  for	  a	  class	  of	  theories	  that	  hold	  that	  truths	  about	  reasons	  are	  somehow	  “constructed”	  out	  of	  our	  rational	  capacities.	  This	  intriguing	  idea	  has	  engaged	  the	  philosophical	  imagination	  at	  least	  since	  the	  time	  of	  the	  ancient	  Greeks.	  Plato	  (1993,	  ch.	  2)	  thought	  it	  sufficiently	  important	  to	  give	  it	  an	  extended	  outing	  in	  Book	  2	  of	  the	  
Republic,	  where	  a	  version	  of	  constructivism	  is	  expounded	  by	  Glaucon,	  one	  of	  Socrates’	  less	  obtuse	  interlocutors.	  It	  was	  influentially	  revived	  by	  Thomas	  Hobbes	  (1994)	  in	  the	  17th	  century	  and	  thereafter	  became	  a	  major	  philosophical	  player	  in	  the	  form	  of	  social	  contract	  theory	  (see	  also	  Locke	  1988;	  Rousseau	  1968).	  It	  was	  given	  perhaps	  the	  most	  detailed	  exposition	  and	  defense	  by	  Immanuel	  Kant	  (1998).	  And	  it	  remains	  a	  dominant	  force	  within	  contemporary	  moral	  and	  political	  philosophy	  thanks	  to	  the	  enduring	  influence	  of	  both	  Hobbes	  (in	  the	  work	  of	  e.g.	  David	  Gauthier	  (1986),	  Gilbert	  Harman	  (1975),	  and	  Sharon	  Street	  (2008;	  2010;	  2012));	  and	  Kant	  (in	  the	  work	  of	  e.g.	  John	  Rawls	  (1971;	  1980;	  1993),	  Christine	  Korsgaard	  (1996a;	  1996b;	  2008;	  2009),	  T.	  M	  Scanlon	  (1982;	  1998),	  and	  Onora	  O’Neill	  (1989)).	  Given	  constructivism’s	  enduring	  popularity	  and	  appeal,	  it	  is	  perhaps	  something	  of	  a	  surprise	  that	  there	  remains	  considerable	  uncertainty	  among	  many	  philosophers	  about	  what	  constructivism	  is	  even	  supposed	  to	  be.	  In	  their	  introduction	  to	  a	  recent	  volume	  on	  constructivism,	  for	  example,	  James	  Lenman	  and	  Yonatan	  Shemmer	  (2012,	  p.	  1)	  note	  that	  while	  constructivism	  “has	  come	  to	  be	  a	  major	  theme	  in	  contemporary	  practical	  philosophy,	  …	  it	  is	  not	  always	  clear	  how	  it	  is	  best	  understood.”	  In	  the	  same	  vein,	  David	  Enoch	  (2011,	  p.	  319)	  complains	  that	  “it	  is	  surprisingly	  hard	  to	  even	  characterize	  the	  view.”	  The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  *	  I	  have	  benefitted	  from	  discussions	  about	  the	  topic	  of	  this	  article	  with	  many	  people	  including	  Hugh	  Barrett,	  Garrett	  Cullity,	  Billy	  Dunaway,	  Tristram	  McPherson,	  Philip	  Pettit,	  François	  Schroeter,	  Laura	  Schroeter,	  Michael	  Smith,	  and	  Daniel	  Star.	  I	  am	  especially	  grateful	  to	  Daniel	  Star	  for	  detailed	  written	  comments.	  Research	  for	  the	  article	  was	  supported	  by	  DP120101507	  and	  DP140102468.	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problem	  is	  that,	  while	  the	  idea	  that	  truths	  about	  reasons	  are	  somehow	  “constructed”	  from	  our	  rational	  capacities	  is	  highly	  suggestive,	  it	  is	  also	  deeply	  elusive.	  There	  have	  been	  a	  number	  of	  interesting	  and	  instructive	  attempts	  to	  render	  it	  more	  precise.	  Yet,	  none,	  to	  my	  mind,	  is	  entirely	  satisfactory.	  My	  aim	  in	  this	  article	  is	  to	  make	  some	  progress	  on	  the	  question	  of	  how	  constructivism	  should	  be	  understood.	  I	  shall	  assume	  that	  a	  satisfactory	  characterization	  of	  constructivism	  should	  be	  able	  to	  do	  at	  least	  three	  things.	  First,	  it	  should	  be	  able	  to	  accommodate	  the	  many,	  quite	  radically	  different	  constructivist	  theories	  and	  explain	  what	  unifies	  them	  by	  identifying	  some	  feature	  that	  they	  have	  in	  common.	  Second,	  it	  should	  also	  be	  able	  to	  explain	  what	  is	  
distinctive	  of	  constructivism	  inasmuch	  as	  it	  suffices	  to	  distinguish	  the	  various	  constructivist	  theories	  from	  other	  non-­‐constructivist	  theories.	  And,	  third,	  it	  should	  also	  be	  able	  to	  explain	  constructivism’s	  prima	  facie	  appeal.	  In	  part,	  this	  is	  simply	  a	  matter	  of	  diligent	  philosophical	  bookkeeping.	  More	  importantly,	  it	  is	  vital	  in	  order	  to	  evaluate	  the	  success	  of	  constructivism	  as	  an	  account	  of	  reasons.	  As	  we	  shall	  see,	  certain	  challenges	  that	  have	  been	  raised	  against	  constructivist	  theories	  are	  based	  on	  dubious	  understandings	  of	  constructivism.	  Other	  challenges	  only	  properly	  come	  into	  focus	  once	  a	  proper	  understanding	  is	  achieved.	  The	  article	  is	  in	  five	  main	  sections.	  I	  will	  begin	  by	  saying	  something	  about	  what	  kind	  of	  theory	  constructivism	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  (section	  1).	  Next,	  I	  will	  consider	  and	  reject	  both	  the	  standard	  proceduralist	  characterization	  of	  constructivism	  (section	  2)	  and	  also	  Sharon	  Street’s	  ingenious	  standpoint	  characterization	  (section	  3).	  I	  will	  then	  suggest	  an	  alternative	  characterization	  according	  to	  which	  what	  is	  central	  is	  the	  role	  played	  by	  certain	  standards	  of	  
correct	  reasoning	  (section	  4).	  I	  will	  conclude	  by	  saying	  something	  about	  the	  implications	  of	  this	  account	  for	  evaluating	  the	  success	  of	  constructivism	  (section	  5).	   Before	  we	  begin,	  two	  brief	  clarificatory	  remarks.	  First,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  stress	  that	  my	  subject	  is	  exclusively	  constructivism	  about	  normative	  reasons.	  Normative	  reasons	  are,	  very	  roughly,	  considerations	  that	  count	  in	  favour	  of	  some	  response	  (see	  Scanlon	  1998,	  p.	  1),	  or	  that	  help	  to	  explain	  or	  determine	  the	  responses	  that	  we	  ought	  to	  have	  (see	  Broome	  2013,	  ch.	  4).	  I	  shall	  have	  nothing	  to	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say	  here	  about	  so-­‐called	  motivating	  reasons,	  which	  are,	  roughly,	  those	  considerations	  that	  help	  to	  explain	  or	  determine	  the	  responses	  that	  we	  in	  fact	  have	  (see	  Smith	  1994,	  pp.	  94-­‐8).	  The	  second	  clarificatory	  remark	  is	  that	  I	  shall	  focus	  almost	  exclusively	  on	  constructivism	  about	  practical	  reasons.	  Practical	  reasons	  are	  reasons	  for	  action,	  intention	  and	  decision.	  I	  shall	  have	  virtually	  nothing	  to	  say	  about	  theoretical	  reasons,	  namely,	  reasons	  for	  belief	  or	  other	  doxastic	  attitudes.	  This	  is	  due,	  in	  part,	  to	  constraints	  of	  space	  and	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  constructivists	  themselves	  have	  focused	  almost	  exclusively	  on	  practical	  reasons	  (though	  see	  Korsgaard	  2009;	  Street	  2009).	  It	  is	  also	  due,	  in	  part,	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  far	  from	  obvious	  how	  to	  extend	  what	  I	  take	  to	  be	  the	  most	  attractive	  version	  of	  constructivism	  to	  the	  theoretical	  domain.	  	  1.	  What	  kind	  of	  theory	  is	  constructivism?	  Constructivism	  is	  a	  theory	  about	  reasons,	  but	  what	  kind	  of	  theory	  is	  it	  supposed	  to	  be?	  I	  suggest	  that	  all	  versions	  of	  constructivism	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  offering	  a	  certain	  view	  of	  what	  explains	  or	  determines1	  in	  some	  sense	  truths	  about	  reasons.2	  Thus,	  constructivist	  theories	  are	  making	  claims	  about	  truths	  about	  reasons	  (i.e.	  about	  the	  world),	  as	  opposed	  to	  claims	  about	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  reason	  (i.e.	  about	  
meaning),	  or	  claims	  about	  our	  beliefs	  about	  reasons.	  And	  constructivist	  theories	  purport	  to	  identify	  what	  explains	  or	  determines	  truths	  about	  reasons,	  as	  opposed	  to	  merely	  espousing	  such	  claims.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  I	  have	  in	  mind	  the	  non-­‐epistemic	  sense	  of	  “explanation,”	  that	  is,	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  one	  truth	  (or	  fact)	  explains	  another	  truth	  (or	  fact).	  See	  Broome	  2013,	  ch.	  4.	  2	  Compare	  this	  to	  Street’s	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  of	  what	  kind	  of	  theory	  constructivism	  is	  supposed	  to	  be.	  Street	  holds	  that	  constructivism	  is	  an	  account	  of	  what	  “the	  truth	  of	  a	  normative	  claim	  consists	  in”	  (Street	  2010,	  p.	  367:	  italics	  added),	  or	  what	  “normative	  truth	  …	  [is]	  constituted	  by”	  (p.	  365).	  Notice	  that	  my	  answer	  is	  different	  from	  Street’s	  in	  two	  respects.	  First,	  I	  take	  constructivism	  to	  be	  an	  account	  of	  what	  explains	  or	  determines	  normative	  truths,	  as	  opposed	  to	  what	  those	  truths	  consist	  in	  or	  are	  constituted	  by.	  What	  normative	  truths	  consist	  in	  or	  are	  constituted	  by	  is	  only	  one	  example	  of	  what	  explains	  or	  determines	  them	  (see	  below).	  Second,	  I	  take	  constructivism	  to	  be	  explaining	  truths	  about	  reasons,	  rather	  than	  normative	  truths.	  While	  as	  a	  historical	  matter	  constructivists	  have	  not	  always	  (explicitly)	  focused	  on	  reasons,	  I	  shall	  interpret	  them	  as	  such.	  Of	  course,	  some	  philosophers	  hold	  that	  normative	  truths	  just	  are	  truths	  about	  reasons	  (e.g.	  Joseph	  Raz	  (1999,	  p.	  67)	  and	  T.	  M.	  Scanlon	  (1998,	  ch.	  1)),	  but	  I	  don’t	  want	  to	  take	  a	  stand	  on	  that	  issue	  here.	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This,	  I	  suggest,	  is	  what	  constructivist	  theories	  have	  in	  common	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  theory	  they	  are.	  Of	  course,	  constructivist	  theories	  can	  also	  differ	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  theory	  they	  are.	  There	  are	  different	  kinds	  of	  constructivism,	  as	  I	  shall	  put	  it.	  This	  is	  because	  there	  are	  different	  kinds	  of	  theories	  concerning	  what	  explains	  or	  determines	  truths	  about	  reasons.	  We	  can	  classify	  these	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  scope	  and	  mode	  of	  the	  explanations	  that	  they	  purport	  to	  identify	  of	  truths	  about	  reasons.	  The	  question	  of	  scope	  concerns	  which	  truths	  about	  reasons	  are	  being	  explained.	  So-­‐called	  local”	  (or	  “restricted”)	  kinds	  of	  constructivism	  only	  purport	  to	  identify	  what	  explains	  some	  special	  class	  of	  truths	  about	  reasons.3	  For	  example,	  Rawls’s	  (1971;	  1993)	  constructivism	  purports	  to	  identify	  what	  explains	  truths	  about	  reasons	  of	  social	  justice.	  Gauthier’s	  (1986)	  constructivism	  purports	  to	  identify	  what	  explains	  truths	  about	  reasons	  of	  morality.	  Scanlon’s	  (1998)	  constructivism	  purports	  to	  identify	  what	  explains	  a	  special	  subset	  of	  truths	  about	  reasons	  of	  morality	  –	  what	  he	  calls	  truths	  about	  what	  we	  owe	  to	  each	  other.	  By	  contrast,	  “global”	  (or	  “thoroughgoing”)	  kinds	  of	  constructivism	  purport	  to	  identify	  some	  feature	  that	  explains	  all	  truths	  about	  reasons.	  Korsgaard	  (1996a;	  1996b)	  and	  Street	  (2008;	  2010)	  are	  at	  least	  global	  constructivists	  about	  practical	  reasons	  and	  both	  have	  attempted	  to	  extend	  their	  constructivism	  to	  the	  theoretical	  domain	  (see	  Korsgaard	  2009;	  Street	  2009).	  The	  question	  of	  mode	  concerns	  the	  mode	  of	  explanation	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  relevant	  truths	  about	  reasons.	  What	  I	  shall	  call	  “normative”	  kinds	  of	  constructivism	  purport	  to	  identify	  normative	  explanations	  of	  the	  relevant	  truths	  about	  reasons.	  The	  normative	  explanation	  of	  truths	  about	  reasons	  (of	  some	  kind)	  is	  what	  makes	  it	  the	  case	  that	  one	  has	  reasons	  (of	  that	  kind);	  or	  why	  one	  has	  reasons	  (of	  that	  kind).	  The	  grounds	  of	  truths	  about	  reasons	  (of	  some	  kind)	  must	  themselves	  be	  truths	  about	  reasons	  (of	  that	  kind).	  Thus,	  Rawls’s	  constructivism	  is	  plausibly	  interpreted	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  normative	  constructivism,	  since	  it	  purports	  to	  give	  an	  account	  of	  what	  grounds	  specific	  truths	  about	  reasons	  of	  social	  justice,	  what	  makes	  social	  institutions	  just,	  or	  why	  just	  institutions	  are	  just,	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  The	  “local”/”global”	  language	  is	  due	  to	  Enoch	  (2011,	  p.	  323).	  The	  “restricted”/”thoroughgoing”	  language	  is	  due	  to	  Street	  (2010,	  pp.	  367-­‐9).	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general	  truth	  about	  social	  justice:	  that	  a	  just	  society	  is	  one	  that	  exhibits	  the	  kind	  of	  impartiality	  required	  by	  the	  original	  position.	  What	  I	  shall	  call	  “constitutive”	  kinds	  of	  constructivism	  purport	  to	  offer	  
constitutive	  explanations	  of	  the	  relevant	  truths	  about	  reasons.	  A	  constitutive	  explanation	  of	  truths	  about	  reasons	  (of	  some	  kind)	  is	  what	  being	  a	  reason	  (of	  that	  kind)	  consists	  in:	  i.e.	  an	  account	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  reasons	  (of	  that	  kind),	  or	  
what	  it	  is	  for	  a	  consideration	  to	  be	  a	  reason	  of	  that	  kind.	  Whatever	  constitutively	  explains	  truths	  about	  reasons	  (of	  some	  kind)	  cannot	  include	  truths	  about	  reasons	  (of	  that	  kind).	  Korsgaard	  (1996a)	  and	  Street	  (2008)	  seem	  to	  be	  offering	  accounts	  of	  what	  constitutively	  explains	  truths	  about	  (practical)	  reasons	  in	  general.	  Scanlon	  (1998)	  also	  seems	  to	  be	  (or	  at	  least	  says	  that	  he	  is)	  offering	  an	  account	  of	  what	  constitutively	  explains	  truths	  about	  morality	  (or	  what	  we	  owe	  to	  each	  other).	  So	  there	  are	  four	  kinds	  of	  constructivism	  in	  conceptual	  space:	  local	  
normative	  constructivism;	  local	  constitutive	  constructivism;	  global	  normative	  
constructivism;	  and	  global	  constitutive	  constructivism.	  We	  shall	  return	  at	  length	  to	  
three	  of	  these	  kinds	  of	  constructivism.	  (I	  shan’t	  have	  anything	  to	  say	  in	  what	  follows	  about	  global	  normative	  constructivism.)	  For	  the	  moment,	  it	  is	  worth	  just	  registering	  that	  this	  taxonomy	  of	  kinds	  of	  constructivism	  differs	  from,	  and	  I	  believe	  represents	  an	  improvement	  on,	  the	  more	  standard	  taxonomy	  that	  divides	  constructivism	  into	  “normative	  ethical”	  and	  “meta-­‐ethical”	  kinds	  (see	  Street	  2010;	  Enoch	  2011).	  The	  main	  problem	  with	  the	  standard	  taxonomy,	  to	  my	  mind,	  is	  that	  it	  runs	  together	  local	  normative	  constructivism	  and	  local	  constitutive	  constructivism.	  As	  we	  shall	  see,	  these	  are	  importantly	  different	  positions	  that	  are	  subject	  to	  importantly	  different	  challenges.	  	  2.	  The	  proceduralist	  characterization	  So	  much	  for	  what	  kind	  of	  theory	  constructivism	  is.	  It	  is	  an	  account	  of	  what	  explains	  or	  determines	  in	  some	  sense	  relevant	  truths	  about	  reasons	  –	  with	  different	  kinds	  of	  constructivism	  differing	  in	  terms	  of	  scope	  and	  mode.	  I	  shall	  take	  rival	  characterizations	  of	  constructivism	  to	  be	  agreed	  on	  this	  point.	  But	  what	  is	  constructivism?	  
	   6	  
The	  standard	  answer	  is	  what	  Sharon	  Street	  (2010,	  p.	  365)	  calls	  the	  “proceduralist	  characterization”	  of	  constructivism.	  According	  to	  the	  proceduralist	  characterization,	  constructivism	  understands	  relevant	  truths	  about	  reasons	  as	  somehow	  explained	  “by	  emergence	  from	  [some	  relevant	  actual	  or	  hypothetical]	  procedure.”	  The	  proceduralist	  characterization	  is	  extremely	  pervasive.	  For	  example,	  Stephen	  Darwall,	  Alan	  Gibbard	  and	  Peter	  Railton	  (1992)	  define	  constructivism	  as	  the	  view	  that	  “there	  are	  no	  [truths	  about	  reasons]	  independent	  of	  the	  finding	  that	  a	  certain	  hypothetical	  procedure	  would	  have	  such	  an	  such	  an	  upshot.”	  Carla	  Bagnoli	  (2011,	  p.	  1)	  writes	  that	  constructivists	  hold	  that	  “normative	  truths	  …	  are	  in	  some	  sense	  determined	  by	  an	  idealized	  process	  of	  rational	  deliberation,	  choice	  or	  agreement.”	  David	  Enoch	  (2011,	  p.	  322)	  holds	  that	  constructivism	  about	  a	  relevant	  discourse	  is	  a	  thesis	  about	  the	  relation	  of	  “correctness-­‐priority	  between	  substantive	  results	  and	  the	  procedures	  leading	  to	  them.	  …	  [T]here	  are	  no	  substantive	  correctness	  criteria	  that	  apply	  to	  (or	  in)	  that	  discourse,	  and	  …	  the	  only	  relevant	  correctness	  criteria	  are	  procedural.”	  The	  basic	  idea	  behind	  the	  proceduralist	  characterization	  is	  perhaps	  best	  grasped	  by	  way	  of	  John	  Rawls’s	  influential	  notion	  of	  “pure	  procedural	  justice”	  (Rawls	  1971,	  pp.	  86-­‐7).	  Cases	  of	  pure	  procedural	  justice	  are	  cases	  where	  “there	  is	  no	  independent	  criterion	  for	  the	  right	  result:	  instead	  there	  is	  a	  correct	  or	  fair	  procedure	  such	  that	  the	  outcome	  is	  likewise	  correct	  or	  fair,	  whatever	  it	  is,	  provided	  that	  the	  procedure	  has	  been	  properly	  followed”	  (Rawls	  1971,	  p.	  86).	  Rawls	  famously	  gives	  the	  example	  of	  gambling.	  “If	  a	  number	  of	  persons	  engage	  in	  a	  series	  of	  fair	  bets,	  the	  distribution	  of	  cash	  after	  each	  bet	  is	  fair,	  or	  at	  least	  not	  unfair,	  whatever	  this	  distribution	  is”	  (Rawls	  1971,	  p.	  86).4	  This	  is	  a	  case	  of	  pure	  procedural	  justice	  because	  there	  is	  no	  procedure-­‐independent	  standard	  of	  fairness	  in	  terms	  of	  which	  we	  can	  evaluate	  the	  state	  of	  affairs	  in	  which	  this	  or	  that	  gambler	  wins	  the	  cash.	  Rather,	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  fair	  that,	  say,	  gambler	  A	  wins	  the	  cash	  is	  explained	  simply	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  result	  is	  the	  product	  of	  the	  relevant	  procedure.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Rawls	  adds:	  “I	  assume	  here	  that	  fair	  bets	  are	  those	  having	  a	  zero	  expectation	  of	  gain,	  and	  that	  bets	  are	  made	  voluntarily,	  that	  no	  one	  cheats,	  and	  so	  on”	  (Rawls	  1971,	  p.	  86).	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According	  to	  the	  proceduralist	  characterization,	  then,	  constructivism	  is	  essentially,	  as	  David	  Enoch	  (2011,	  p.	  319)	  has	  helpfully	  put,	  “an	  attempt	  to	  generalize	  from	  …	  the	  model	  of	  pure	  procedural	  justice	  …	  It	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  think	  of	  a	  whole	  class	  of	  normative	  facts	  as	  constructed	  in	  some	  analogous	  ways,	  so	  that	  their	  status	  as	  normative	  facts	  depends	  on	  their	  being	  the	  outcome	  of	  some	  specified	  procedure.”	  Thus,	  for	  example,	  Rawlsian	  constructivism	  holds	  that	  truths	  about	  social	  justice	  are	  explained	  by	  what	  would	  emerge	  from	  the	  procedure	  described	  by	  the	  original	  position.	  Scanlonian	  constructivism	  holds	  that	  truths	  about	  what	  we	  owe	  to	  each	  other	  are	  explained	  by	  what	  would	  emerge	  from	  the	  procedure	  of	  justifiability	  to	  others.	  Korsgardian	  constructivism	  holds	  that	  truths	  about	  practical	  reasons	  in	  general	  are	  explained	  by	  what	  would	  emerge	  from	  the	  procedure	  of	  reflective	  endorsement.	  And	  so	  on.	  Recently,	  Sharon	  Street	  has	  raised	  a	  number	  of	  objections	  against	  the	  proceduralist	  characterization.	  I	  shall	  focus	  here	  on	  two	  of	  her	  objections.5	  First,	  Street	  objects	  that	  the	  proceduralist	  characterization	  fails	  to	  explain	  what	  is	  
distinctive	  about	  constructivism	  as	  a	  meta-­‐ethical	  theory.	  In	  particular,	  it	  fails	  to	  distinguish	  constructivism	  from	  naturalistic	  versions	  of	  the	  ideal	  observer	  theory,	  which	  “seek	  to	  reduce	  normative	  facts	  to	  natural	  facts	  about	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Street	  also	  mentions	  an	  objection	  originally	  raised	  by	  Stephen	  Darwall,	  Alan	  Gibbard	  and	  Peter	  Railton	  (1992,	  p.	  13),	  which	  holds	  that	  the	  proceduralist	  characterization	  is	  unable	  to	  accommodate	  metaethical	  versions	  of	  constructivism	  since	  constructivism,	  thus	  characterized,	  is	  not	  really	  a	  meta-­‐ethical	  position	  at	  all.	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  “if	  one	  constructivist	  claims	  that	  normative	  truth	  is	  constituted	  by	  emergence	  from	  procedure	  A,	  and	  another	  claims	  that	  normative	  truth	  is	  constituted	  by	  emergence	  from	  some	  different	  procedure	  B,	  then	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  this	  is	  anything	  but	  a	  substantive	  normative	  dispute,	  entirely	  compatible	  with	  any	  number	  of	  metaethical	  interpretations”	  (Street	  2010,	  p.	  365).	  This	  strikes	  me	  as	  a	  mistake.	  Consider,	  by	  analogy,	  a	  dispute	  between	  two	  rival	  proceduralists	  about	  being	  “out”	  in	  cricket.	  Suppose	  that	  the	  first	  holds	  that	  truths	  about	  being	  “out”	  are	  explained	  by	  being	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  procedure	  in	  which	  the	  umpire	  gives	  the	  batsman	  “out,”	  whereas	  the	  second	  holds	  that	  they	  are	  explained	  by	  being	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  procedure	  in	  which	  the	  bowler’s	  appeal	  is	  above	  100	  decibels	  in	  volume.	  Clearly,	  this	  needn’t	  be	  a	  merely	  substantive	  dispute.	  It	  might	  very	  well	  instead	  be	  a	  dispute	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  being	  “out”;	  about	  what	  being	  “out”	  consists	  in;	  about	  what	  it	  is	  for	  a	  batsman	  to	  be	  “out.”	  It	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  we	  should	  say	  the	  same	  thing	  about	  the	  dispute	  between	  rival	  proceduralists	  about	  reasons.	  Thus,	  suppose	  that	  the	  first	  proceduralist	  holds	  that	  truths	  about	  reasons	  are	  explained	  by	  being	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  procedure	  of	  purely	  instrumental	  reasoning,	  whereas	  the	  second	  holds	  that	  truths	  about	  reasons	  are	  explained	  by	  being	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  procedure	  that	  involves	  scrutinizing	  ends	  as	  well	  as	  means.	  Once	  again,	  this	  might	  be	  a	  merely	  substantive	  dispute.	  But	  it	  needn’t	  be.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  it	  might	  very	  well	  be	  a	  dispute	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  reasons;	  about	  what	  being	  a	  reason	  consists	  in;	  about	  what	  it	  is	  for	  a	  consideration	  to	  be	  a	  reason.	  This	  is	  surely	  a	  meta-­‐ethical	  dispute.	  To	  be	  sure,	  perhaps	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  dispute	  hold	  meta-­‐ethical	  positions	  that	  are	  ultimately	  
implausible.	  Perhaps,	  whereas	  proceduralism	  is	  a	  plausible	  view	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  being	  “out”	  in	  cricket,	  it	  is	  ultimately	  an	  implausible	  view	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  reasons.	  But	  there	  is	  nothing	  
incoherent	  about	  the	  position.	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responses	  of	  agents	  in	  certain	  idealized	  (but	  naturalistically	  characterized)	  circumstances”	  (Street	  2010,	  p.	  365).	  The	  proponent	  of	  the	  proceduralist	  characterization	  has	  a	  straightforward	  rejoinder	  to	  this	  objection	  as	  stated.	  This	  is	  that	  the	  proceduralist	  characterization	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  a	  characterization	  of	  constructivism	  in	  general,	  not	  of	  meta-­‐ethical	  constructivism	  in	  particular.	  It	  purports	  to	  explain	  what	  is	  common	  to	  and	  distinctive	  of	  versions	  of	  constructivism	  as	  such.	  As	  such,	  it	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  claim	  that	  further	  conditions	  must	  be	  added	  to	  a	  characterization	  of	  meta-­‐ethical	  constructivism	  –	  including	  perhaps	  the	  condition	  that	  the	  idealizations	  imposed	  not	  be	  reducible	  to	  natural	  facts.6	  This	  would	  suffice	  to	  distinguish	  meta-­‐ethical	  constructivism	  from	  naturalistic	  versions	  of	  the	  ideal	  observer	  theory.7	  Still,	  Street	  is	  surely	  right	  that,	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  idealizations	  imposed	  on	  the	  relevant	  procedures	  are	  reducible	  to	  natural	  facts,	  a	  characterization	  of	  constructivism	  should	  be	  able	  to	  distinguish	  constructivism	  from	  the	  ideal	  observer	  theory.	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  the	  proceduralist	  characterization	  seems	  to	  fail	  to	  do	  so	  inasmuch	  as	  the	  ideal	  observer,	  no	  less	  than	  constructivism,	  is	  clearly	  a	  version	  of	  proceduralism.	  Again,	  however,	  there	  is	  a	  relatively	  simple	  response.8	  While	  both	  constructivism	  (according	  to	  the	  proceduralist	  characterization)	  and	  the	  ideal	  observer	  theory	  assign	  a	  central	  role	  to	  procedures,	  the	  character	  of	  the	  procedures	  is	  importantly	  different.	  In	  particular,	  the	  proponent	  of	  the	  proceduralist	  characterization	  holds	  (or	  should	  hold)	  that	  what	  is	  distinctive	  of	  constructivist	  theories	  is	  that	  they	  are	  trying	  to	  identify	  what	  explains	  truths	  about	  reasons	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  outcome	  of	  some	  
deliberative	  procedure:	  a	  procedure	  that	  culminates	  in	  a	  decision,	  choice	  or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Indeed,	  Street	  herself	  adds	  further	  conditions	  to	  her	  own	  favoured	  “standpoint”	  characterization	  of	  constructivism	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  what	  is	  distinctive	  of	  meta-­‐ethical	  versions	  of	  constructivism	  (see	  Street	  2010,	  p.	  369).	  7	  It	  might	  be	  objected	  that	  this	  move	  succeeds	  in	  distinguishing	  meta-­‐ethical	  constructivism	  from	  naturalistic	  versions	  of	  the	  ideal	  observer	  theory	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  rendering	  it	  indistinguishable	  from	  meta-­‐ethical	  non-­‐naturalism.	  The	  objection	  that	  meta-­‐ethical	  constructivism	  does	  not	  represent	  a	  distinctive	  meta-­‐ethical	  position	  is	  an	  important	  one	  that	  I	  will	  discuss	  in	  section	  5.	  But	  notice	  that	  it	  is	  not	  specifically	  an	  objection	  to	  the	  proceduralist	  characterization	  so	  much	  as	  an	  important	  objection	  to	  constructivism	  itself,	  however	  reasonably	  characterized.	  8	  Alternatively,	  the	  proponent	  of	  the	  proceduralist	  characterization	  might	  simply	  embrace	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  ideal	  observer	  theory	  counts	  as	  a	  version	  of	  constructivism.	  Clearly,	  there	  is	  some	  kind	  of	  significant	  resemblance	  between	  paradigmatic	  constructivist	  theories	  and	  versions	  of	  the	  ideal	  observer	  theory.	  I	  won’t	  discuss	  this	  move	  here	  except	  to	  say	  that	  it	  seems	  to	  me	  to	  involve	  biting	  a	  fairly	  significant	  bullet;	  and	  that	  if	  there	  is	  some	  alternative	  characterization	  that	  does	  not	  have	  this	  implication,	  this	  gives	  us	  reason	  to	  prefer	  the	  alternative	  characterization.	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agreement.	  By	  contrast,	  proponents	  of	  the	  ideal	  observer	  theory	  adduce	  procedures	  of	  a	  different	  kind	  –	  “cognitive	  psychotherapy,”	  “imaginative	  acquaintance,”	  “preference	  laundering,”	  and	  so	  on	  –	  that	  are	  supposed	  to	  culminate	  in	  genuine	  or	  authentic	  desires	  or	  preferences.	  This	  suffices	  to	  distinguish	  constructivism	  from	  the	  ideal	  observer	  theory.	  Street	  also	  mentions	  a	  second	  objection	  that,	  I	  believe,	  is	  more	  compelling.	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  this	  objection,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  emphasize	  that	  the	  proceduralist	  characterization	  holds	  that	  constructivism	  is	  the	  view	  that	  truths	  about	  reasons	  are	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  emerges	  from	  some	  relevant	  procedure.	  So,	  it	  implies	  that	  in	  order	  for	  a	  theory	  to	  count	  as	  constructivist,	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  procedure	  must	  be	  playing	  a	  genuinely	  explanatory	  role	  within	  the	  theory.	  Perhaps	  there	  are	  some	  versions	  of	  constructivism	  where	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  procedure	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  playing	  the	  requisite	  explanatory	  role.	  But	  in	  the	  case	  of	  many	  other	  versions	  of	  constructivism,	  this	  seems	  far	  less	  plausible.	  In	  particular,	  Street	  mentions	  the	  case	  of	  Rawls.	  It	  seems	  very	  odd	  to	  suppose	  that	  it	  is	  literally	  being	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  hypothetical	  procedure	  described	  by	  the	  original	  position	  that	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  explaining	  truths	  about	  the	  justice	  of	  particular	  social	  institutions.	  Rather,	  “the	  device	  of	  the	  original	  position	  is	  ultimately	  best	  understood	  as	  a	  heuristic	  device	  whose	  function	  is	  to	  capture,	  organize,	  and	  help	  us	  to	  investigate”	  what	  it	  is	  that	  is	  really	  explaining	  truths	  about	  reasons	  (Street	  2010,	  p.	  366).	  A	  proponent	  of	  the	  proceduralist	  characterization	  might	  stubbornly	  insist	  that	  what	  this	  shows	  is	  that	  Rawls	  is	  not	  a	  constructivist.	  Indeed,	  there	  is	  a	  line	  of	  argument	  –	  first	  presented,	  to	  my	  knowledge,	  by	  Ronald	  Dworkin	  (1975)	  in	  his	  influential	  critique	  of	  Rawls	  –	  according	  to	  which	  Rawls	  is,	  in	  fact,	  a	  closet	  
intuitionist.	  The	  original	  position	  is	  simply	  a	  way	  of	  rendering	  vivid	  relevant	  irreducible,	  sui	  generis,	  procedure-­‐independent	  truths	  about	  social	  justice.	  But	  this	  is	  not	  a	  welcome	  result,	  given	  Rawls’s	  detailed	  exposition	  of	  the	  constructivist	  nature	  of	  his	  theory	  and	  the	  lengths	  to	  which	  he	  goes	  to	  distinguish	  it	  from	  intuitionism.	  If	  the	  proceduralist	  characterization	  has	  this	  implication,	  then	  it	  is	  worth	  looking	  for	  some	  alternative	  characterization	  that	  has	  the	  resources	  to	  accommodate	  theories	  like	  Rawls’s	  that	  seem	  to	  be	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paradigmatically	  constructivist	  even	  if	  it	  is	  not	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  procedure	  that	  is	  central.	  	  3.	  The	  standpoint	  characterization	  This	  brings	  us	  to	  Street’s	  own	  preferred	  way	  of	  characterizing	  constructivism.	  According	  to	  Street,	  constructivism	  is	  the	  view	  that	  truths	  about	  reasons	  are	  explained	  by	  what	  is	  “entailed”	  from	  within	  a	  particular	  “evaluative	  standpoint”	  or	  “point	  of	  view”	  (Street	  2010,	  p.	  367).	  Call	  this	  the	  standpoint	  characterization	  of	  constructivism.9	  There	  are	  two	  key	  notions	  here.	  The	  first	  is	  the	  notion	  of	  an	  evaluative	  
standpoint.	  An	  evaluative	  standpoint	  is	  comprised	  of	  a	  set	  of	  values	  or	  evaluative	  judgments.	  Evaluative	  judgments,	  according	  to	  Street,	  are	  sui	  generis	  mental	  states.	  They	  are	  not	  beliefs	  (or	  other	  cognitive	  states)	  (Street	  2010,	  p.	  381,	  n.	  13).	  Nor	  are	  they	  desires	  (or	  other	  conative	  states)	  (Street	  2010,	  p.	  374).	  Each	  of	  us	  has	  a	  particular	  evaluative	  standpoint.	  We	  can	  also	  talk	  of	  evaluative	  standpoints	  in	  the	  abstract.	  For	  example,	  an	  egalitarian	  evaluative	  standpoint	  is	  one	  that	  is	  constituted	  by	  certain	  egalitarian	  evaluative	  judgements:	  e.g.	  that	  everyone	  is	  entitled	  to	  equal	  treatment.	  A	  utilitarian	  evaluative	  standpoint	  is	  constituted	  by	  certain	  utilitarian	  evaluative	  judgements:	  e.g.	  that	  well-­‐being	  is	  all	  that	  matters	  morally	  speaking.	  The	  second	  key	  notion	  is	  the	  notion	  of	  what	  is	  entailed	  from	  within	  an	  evaluative	  standpoint.	  Street	  insists	  that	  this	  “doesn’t	  presuppose	  any	  normative	  notions.	  To	  explain	  the	  sense	  of	  entailment,	  we	  needn’t	  make	  any	  substantive	  normative	  assumptions	  –	  for	  example,	  about	  what	  agents	  should	  or	  ought	  to	  do	  or	  infer”	  (Street	  2010,	  p.	  367).	  Rather,	  to	  say	  that	  something	  is	  “entailed”	  from	  within	  a	  particular	  standpoint	  is	  to	  say	  that	  it	  is	  required	  by	  rules	  that	  are	  “constitutively	  involved	  in	  the	  attitude	  of	  valuing,	  or	  normative	  judgment,	  as	  such”	  (Street	  2010,	  p.	  373).	  Street	  gives	  the	  following	  example.	  	  [S]uppose	  that	  someone	  says,	  ‘I	  have	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  reason	  to	  get	  to	  Rome	  immediately,	  and	  to	  do	  so	  it	  is	  necessary	  that	  I	  buy	  a	  plane	  ticket,	  and	  I	  have	  no	  reason	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Street	  herself	  calls	  it	  the	  “practical	  standpoint	  characterization”	  (Street	  2010,	  pp.	  366-­‐7).	  However,	  since	  Street	  appears	  to	  want	  constructivism	  to	  be	  potentially	  a	  theory	  about	  theoretical	  reasons,	  as	  well	  as	  practical	  reasons,	  I	  have	  excised	  the	  word	  “practical.”	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to	  buy	  a	  plane	  ticket.’	  …	  Our	  diagnosis	  of	  such	  a	  case	  is	  not	  that	  the	  person	  is	  making	  a	  
false	  judgment	  about	  his	  reasons,	  but	  rather	  that	  he	  doesn’t	  genuinely	  judge	  himself	  to	  
have	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  reason	  to	  get	  to	  Rome	  (or	  else	  doesn’t	  genuinely	  judge	  
himself	  to	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  buy	  a	  plane	  ticket)	  at	  all	  (Street	  2010,	  p.	  374).	  	  If	  this	  is	  right,	  then	  it	  suggests	  that	  some	  kind	  of	  means-­‐ends	  coherence	  rule	  is	  partly	  constitutive	  of	  the	  attitude	  of	  valuing	  and,	  hence,	  that	  one	  way	  in	  which	  an	  attitude	  can	  be	  “entailed”	  from	  within	  one’s	  evaluative	  standpoint	  is	  that	  one	  is	  required	  to	  have	  the	  attitude	  given	  the	  values	  that	  constitute	  one’s	  evaluative	  standpoint	  plus	  the	  means-­‐ends	  coherence	  rule.	  Similarly,	  if	  there	  are	  additional	  rules	  that	  are	  constitutively	  involved	  in	  the	  attitude	  of	  valuing,	  then	  the	  attitudes	  that	  are	  required	  of	  one	  given	  one’s	  values	  plus	  the	  additional	  rules,	  will	  also	  count	  as	  “entailed”	  from	  within	  one’s	  evaluative	  standpoint.	  According	  to	  the	  standpoint	  characterization,	  then,	  it	  is	  this	  idea	  of	  what	  is	  entailed	  from	  within	  an	  evaluative	  standpoint	  that	  is	  the	  “philosophical	  heart”	  of	  constructivism.	  By	  contrast,	  “the	  notion	  of	  a	  procedure	  is	  ultimately	  merely	  a	  heuristic	  device”	  (p.	  366).	  Thus,	  for	  example,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Rawls’s	  constructivism,	  “the	  original	  position	  is	  ultimately	  best	  understood	  as	  a	  heuristic	  device	  whose	  function	  is	  to	  capture,	  organize,	  and	  help	  us	  to	  investigate	  what	  follows	  from	  a	  certain	  evaluative	  standpoint	  on	  the	  world	  –	  in	  particular,	  the	  evaluative	  standpoint	  shared	  by	  those	  of	  us	  who	  accept	  liberal	  democratic	  values	  such	  as	  freedom	  and	  equality	  of	  persons”	  (Street	  2010,	  p.	  366).	  It	  is	  the	  central	  role	  played	  by	  this	  liberal	  democratic	  evaluative	  standpoint,	  not	  the	  procedure	  described	  by	  the	  original	  position,	  that	  explains	  why	  Rawls’s	  theory	  is	  a	  version	  of	  constructivism.	  Street’s	  standpoint	  characterization	  offers	  a	  novel	  and	  ingenious	  way	  of	  characterizing	  constructivism.	  It	  strikes	  me	  as	  a	  genuine	  philosophical	  advance	  on	  the	  orthodox	  proceduralist	  characterization.	  Nonetheless,	  I	  shall	  now	  argue	  that	  it	  faces	  two	  serious	  problems.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  it	  is	  unduly	  restrictive;	  there	  are	  certain	  constructivist	  theories	  that	  it	  can’t	  accommodate.	  The	  second	  is	  that	  it	  doesn’t	  adequately	  explain	  what	  is	  distinctive	  of	  constructivism.	  The	  first	  problem	  is	  that	  the	  standpoint	  characterization	  is	  unduly	  restrictive.	  It	  can	  accommodate	  many	  but	  not	  all	  paradigmatically	  constructivist	  theories.	  I	  shall	  point	  to	  three	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  standpoint	  characterization	  is	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unduly	  restrictive.	  While	  it	  might	  potentially	  be	  modified	  to	  address	  the	  first	  two,	  the	  third	  is	  decisive,	  or	  so	  it	  seems	  to	  me.	  First,	  the	  standpoint	  characterization	  understands	  constructivist	  views	  as	  holding	  that	  truths	  about	  reasons	  are	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  is	  entailed	  from	  within	  a	  particular	  evaluative	  standpoint,	  where	  this	  is	  understood	  to	  involve	  a	  special	  sui	  generis	  evaluative	  attitude	  that	  is	  distinct	  from	  both	  belief	  and	  desire	  (Street	  2010,	  p.	  374).	  This	  means	  that	  it	  excludes	  those	  versions	  of	  constructivism,	  such	  as	  David	  Gauthier’s	  (1986),	  that	  adduce	  purely	  non-­‐
evaluative	  attitudes:	  desires	  and	  non-­‐evaluative	  beliefs.	  It	  also	  excludes	  those	  versions	  of	  constructivism,	  such	  as	  Scanlon’s,	  that	  understand	  valuing	  as	  simply	  the	  having	  of	  evaluative	  beliefs:	  specifically,	  beliefs	  about	  reasons.	  This	  is	  a	  serious	  limitation.10	  But	  there	  is	  a	  straightforward	  modification	  that	  suffices	  to	  resolve	  it,	  namely	  to	  be	  more	  inclusive	  about	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  standpoint	  or	  point	  of	  view	  such	  that	  evaluative	  beliefs	  and	  (certain)	  non-­‐evaluative	  attitudes	  may	  be	  included.	  Second,	  the	  standpoint	  characterization	  understands	  constructivist	  views	  as	  holding	  that	  truths	  about	  reasons	  are	  explained	  by	  what	  is	  entailed	  from	  within	  an	  evaluative	  standpoint.	  In	  consequence,	  it	  excludes	  those	  contractualist	  or	  contractarian	  versions	  of	  constructivism	  that	  purport	  to	  explain	  truths	  about	  reasons,	  not	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  single	  (perhaps	  shared)	  standpoint,	  but	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  
plurality	  of	  standpoints.11	  Again,	  Gauthier’s	  (1986)	  theory	  provides	  a	  good	  example.	  According	  to	  Gauthier,	  truths	  about	  morality	  are	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  principles	  to	  which	  it	  would	  be	  instrumentally	  rational	  for	  individuals	  to	  dispose	  themselves	  to	  comply.	  We	  might	  say	  that	  this	  means	  that	  truths	  about	  morality	  are	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  principles	  such	  that,	  for	  each	  individual,	  the	  disposition	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  principles	  is	  entailed	  from	  within	  that	  individual’s	  standpoint.	  But	  it	  is	  certainly	  not	  the	  case	  that	  truths	  about	  moral	  reasons	  are	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  is	  entailed	  from	  some	  single	  (shared)	  standpoint.	  Indeed,	  there	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Street’s	  notion	  of	  sui	  generis	  “valuing”	  is	  also	  rather	  elusive.	  For	  an	  excellent	  critical	  discussion,	  see	  Ridge	  2012.	  11	  This	  is	  what	  Stephen	  Darwall	  (2003)	  takes	  to	  be	  the	  central	  bone	  of	  contention	  between	  Hobbesian	  and	  Kantian	  versions	  of	  contractualism;	  or,	  as	  Darwall,	  puts	  it,	  between	  contractarians	  and	  contractualists.	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no	  single	  (shared)	  standpoint	  from	  within	  which	  anything	  is	  entailed.12	  Again,	  this	  is	  a	  serious	  limitation	  of	  the	  standpoint	  characterization.	  But,	  again,	  it	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  the	  standpoint	  characterization	  could	  be	  modified	  to	  deal	  with	  this	  problem.	  The	  required	  modification	  would	  understand	  constructivism	  as	  the	  view	  that	  truths	  about	  reasons	  are	  somehow	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  is	  entailed	  from	  within	  some	  set	  of	  standpoints.	  This	  would	  suffice	  to	  accommodate	  views,	  such	  as	  Gauthier’s,	  that	  insist	  upon	  a	  plurality	  of	  standpoints.	  Third	  and	  most	  importantly,	  the	  standpoint	  characterization	  has	  the	  implication	  that	  constructivists	  are	  committed	  to	  a	  very	  particular	  conception	  of	  the	  rules	  that	  describe	  what	  is	  “entailed”	  from	  within	  a	  standpoint.	  The	  rules	  must	  be	  something	  like	  1)	  requirements	  of	  rationality	  that	  2)	  have	  narrow-­‐scope	  and	  3)	  that	  are	  constitutive	  of	  the	  attitude	  of	  valuing.	  Let	  us	  take	  each	  of	  these	  in	  turn.	  To	  begin	  with,	  the	  rules	  must	  be	  something	  like	  what	  have	  been	  called	  structural	  requirements	  of	  rationality,13	  where	  such	  requirements	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  distinct	  from	  both	  substantive	  norms	  (claims	  that	  are	  composed	  of	  claims	  about	  reasons)	  and	  rules	  of	  deliberation	  (see	  Broome	  1999;	  2013;	  Schroeder	  2004;	  Kolodny	  2005;	  Southwood	  2008).	  They	  can’t	  be	  or	  involve	  substantive	  
norms	  because,	  as	  we	  saw,	  Street	  is	  quite	  explicit	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  entailment	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  normatively	  neutral.	  “To	  explain	  the	  sense	  of	  entailment,	  we	  needn’t	  make	  any	  substantive	  normative	  assumptions	  –	  for	  example,	  about	  what	  agents	  should	  or	  ought	  to	  do	  or	  infer”	  (Street	  2010,	  p.	  367).	  They	  can’t	  be	  rules	  of	  
deliberation	  because	  such	  rules	  don’t	  require	  anything	  of	  us	  just	  insofar	  as	  we	  
have	  certain	  attitudes.	  Rather,	  they	  only	  require	  things	  of	  us	  insofar	  as	  we	  are	  engaged	  in	  the	  activity	  of	  deliberating.	  To	  be	  sure,	  plausibly	  we	  deliberate	  with	  (the	  contents	  of)	  the	  attitudes	  that	  we	  have.	  But	  such	  deliberation	  requires	  somehow	  activating	  these	  attitudes.	  The	  mere	  fact	  that	  we	  have	  certain	  attitudes	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Someone	  might	  respond	  by	  saying	  that	  there	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  shared	  standpoint:	  the	  standpoint	  constituted	  by	  the	  shared	  desire	  to	  cooperate	  conditional	  on	  others	  also	  cooperating.	  But	  that	  would	  be	  a	  mistake.	  Gauthier	  holds	  that	  one’s	  standpoint	  is	  constituted	  by	  one’s	  own	  “non-­‐tuistic”	  desires;	  and	  one	  has	  the	  desire	  to	  cooperate,	  conditional	  on	  others	  also	  cooperating,	  only	  insofar	  as	  and	  because	  cooperation	  is	  taken	  to	  help	  realize	  these	  desires.	  In	  any	  case,	  the	  “shared	  standpoint”	  that	  is	  constituted	  by	  the	  shared	  desire	  to	  cooperate	  conditional	  on	  others	  also	  cooperating	  is	  plainly	  insufficient	  to	  explain	  truths	  about	  moral	  reasons.	  For	  this	  we	  need	  the	  plurality	  of	  individual	  standpoints.	  13	  Requirements	  of	  rationality,	  in	  this	  sense,	  are	  “requirements	  of	  something	  like	  internal	  coherence	  among	  our	  mental	  states”	  (Southwood	  2008,	  p.	  9).	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plus	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  are	  subject	  to	  certain	  rules	  of	  deliberation	  doesn’t	  entail	  anything.	  Notice	  that	  this	  means	  that	  the	  standpoint	  characterization	  excludes	  those	  versions	  of	  constructivism	  that	  recognize	  a	  central	  role	  for	  deliberation	  in	  accordance	  with	  certain	  requirements,	  such	  as	  Jurgen	  Habermas’s	  “discourse	  ethics”	  (Habermas	  1984,	  1987)	  and	  the	  related	  “deliberative	  contractualism”	  that	  I	  have	  myself	  defended	  elsewhere	  (Southwood	  2010,	  ch.	  4).	  Such	  theories	  simply	  cannot	  be	  represented	  as	  genuinely	  constructivist	  according	  to	  the	  standpoint	  characterization.	  Next,	  the	  rules	  must	  be	  narrow-­‐scope	  in	  form.14	  Take	  the	  means-­‐ends	  coherence	  rule	  that	  Street	  endorses.	  This	  holds	  that	  one	  is	  required	  to	  judge	  that	  one	  has	  reason	  to	  Y	  if	  one	  judges	  that	  one	  has	  sufficient	  reason	  to	  X	  and	  judges	  that	  one	  can	  only	  X	  if	  one	  Ys.	  John	  Broome	  (1999)	  has	  noted	  that	  such	  rules	  can	  be	  interpreted	  in	  two	  ways.	  According	  to	  the	  narrow-­‐scope	  interpretation,	  the	  requirement	  applies	  to	  the	  consequent	  of	  the	  conditional.	  So	  the	  correct	  interpretation	  holds	  that	  if	  one	  judges	  that	  one	  has	  sufficient	  reason	  to	  X	  and	  judges	  that	  one	  can	  only	  X	  if	  one	  Ys,	  then	  one	  is	  required	  to	  judge	  that	  one	  has	  reason	  to	  Y.	  By	  contrast,	  according	  to	  the	  wide-­‐scope	  interpretation,	  the	  requirement	  ranges	  over	  the	  whole	  conditional.	  So	  the	  correct	  interpretation	  of	  the	  rule	  holds	  that	  one	  is	  required	  to	  see	  to	  it	  that	  (if	  one	  judges	  that	  one	  has	  sufficient	  reason	  to	  X	  and	  believes	  that	  one	  can	  only	  X	  if	  one	  Ys,	  then	  one	  judges	  that	  one	  has	  reason	  to	  Y).	  Notice	  that	  wide-­‐scope	  rules	  never	  require	  us	  to	  have	  
particular	  attitudes.	  Rather,	  they	  simply	  require	  us	  to	  have	  certain	  combinations	  of	  attitudes.	  The	  attitudes	  that	  comprise	  a	  particular	  standpoint	  plus	  wide-­‐scope	  rules	  never	  entail	  anything.	  Thus,	  once	  again,	  the	  proceduralist	  characterization	  necessarily	  excludes	  versions	  of	  constructivism	  that	  are	  based	  on	  wide-­‐scope	  rules.	  Finally,	  the	  rules	  must	  be	  understood	  as	  “constitutively	  involved	  in	  the	  attitude	  of	  valuing,	  or	  normative	  judgment,	  as	  such”	  (Street	  2010,	  p.	  373).	  Notice	  that	  this	  ties	  constructivism	  inexorably	  to	  constitutivism:	  roughly,	  the	  thesis	  that	  the	  rules	  of	  (practical)	  reason	  partly	  constitute	  the	  evaluative	  standpoint	  (see	  Katsafanas	  this	  volume).	  Many	  constructivists,	  such	  as	  Kant,	  Korsgaard,	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Some	  philosophers	  will	  be	  worried	  by	  the	  combination	  of	  first	  these	  two	  commitments.	  John	  Broome	  (1999;	  2013),	  for	  example,	  has	  influentially	  argued	  that	  requirements	  of	  rationality,	  such	  as	  the	  means-­‐ends	  coherence	  rule,	  are	  wide-­‐scope	  in	  form.	  I	  shall	  set	  aside	  this	  worry.	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indeed	  Street	  herself)	  are	  indeed	  constitutivists	  of	  this	  kind.	  And	  constitutivism	  is	  doing	  important	  philosophical	  work	  for	  these	  constructivists,	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  below.	  But	  it	  is	  highly	  questionable	  that	  constructivists	  must	  be	  constitutivists	  as	  
a	  matter	  of	  definition.	  For	  example,	  Scanlon’s	  and	  Rawls’s	  constructivist	  theories	  don’t	  seem	  to	  involve,	  or	  indeed	  to	  be	  consistent	  with,	  constitutivism.	  If	  that’s	  right,	  the	  standpoint	  characterization	  implies	  that	  Scanlon	  and	  Rawls	  are	  not	  really	  constructivists	  –	  clearly	  an	  unacceptable	  result.	  The	  first	  problem	  with	  the	  standpoint	  characterization,	  then,	  is	  that	  it’s	  too	  restrictive;	  it	  can’t	  accommodate	  certain	  constructivist	  theories.	  There	  is	  also	  a	  second	  problem	  with	  the	  standpoint	  characterization.	  This	  is	  that	  it	  fails	  to	  give	  a	  plausible	  account	  of	  what	  is	  distinctive	  about	  constructivism.	  One	  way	  to	  bring	  this	  out	  is	  to	  note	  that	  broadly	  Humean	  theories	  of	  reasons	  (e.g.	  Schroeder	  2007)	  seem	  to	  come	  tantalizingly	  close	  to	  counting	  as	  versions	  of	  constructivism	  by	  the	  lights	  of	  the	  standpoint	  characterization.	  Humeans	  can	  also	  be	  interpreted	  as	  holding	  that	  truths	  about	  reasons	  are	  to	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  is	  rationally	  required	  of	  us	  from	  within	  a	  certain	  standpoint,	  namely,	  the	  standpoint	  comprising	  one’s	  desires	  (and	  perhaps	  one’s	  means-­‐ends	  beliefs).	  Street	  acknowledges	  the	  similarity	  between	  the	  views	  but	  insists	  that	  constructivist	  theories	  remain	  “crucially	  different	  from	  standard	  Humean	  views”	  inasmuch	  as	  “they	  take	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  attitude	  of	  valuing	  or	  normative	  judgment	  –	  in	  contrast	  to	  that	  of	  mere	  desire	  –	  to	  be	  essential”	  (Street	  2010,	  p.	  370).	  Of	  course,	  this	  suggestion	  blocks	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  modification	  to	  the	  standpoint	  characterization	  that	  I	  suggested	  above	  was	  needed	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  excluding	  certain	  versions	  of	  constructivism,	  such	  as	  Gauthier’s.	  More	  importantly,	  it	  simply	  doesn’t	  seem	  to	  get	  to	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  difference	  between	  constructivist	  and	  Humean	  theories.	  What	  is	  missing	  from	  the	  standpoint	  characterization,	  it	  seems	  to	  me,	  is	  a	  proper	  recognition	  of	  the	  privileged	  place	  that	  constructivists	  give	  to	  reasoning	  in	  the	  explanation	  of	  truths	  about	  reasons.	  Whereas	  Humeans	  adduce	  requirements	  of	  rationality	  as	  a	  means	  of	  ensuring	  that	  agents	  get	  what	  they	  really	  (that	  is,	  ultimately)	  want,	  or	  that	  agents’	  desires	  are	  genuine	  or	  authentic	  inasmuch	  as	  they	  are	  not	  based	  on	  false	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beliefs,	  constructivists	  point	  to	  the	  correct	  exercise	  of	  reasoning	  as	  the	  source	  of	  truths	  about	  reasons.15	  Let	  me	  sum	  up.	  We	  can	  learn	  a	  lot	  from	  Street’s	  standpoint	  characterization.	  It	  represents	  a	  clear	  improvement	  on	  the	  proceduralist	  characterization.	  Nonetheless,	  it	  fails	  to	  provide	  a	  sufficiently	  general	  and	  distinctive	  characterization	  of	  constructivism.	  For	  that	  we	  need	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  account.	  	  4.	  The	  correct	  reasoning	  characterization	  My	  simple	  suggestion	  is	  that	  we	  should	  understand	  constructivism	  as	  a	  view	  about	  the	  primacy	  of	  correct	  reasoning	  in	  explaining	  truths	  about	  reasons.	  It	  is	  natural	  to	  suppose	  that	  reasoning	  correctly	  involves	  being	  appropriately	  responsive	  to	  relevant	  reasons	  for	  and	  against	  acting	  in	  different	  ways	  that	  are	  prior	  to	  and	  independent	  of	  our	  reasoning	  about	  them.	  Constructivism,	  I	  suggest,	  is	  the	  view	  that	  the	  order	  of	  explanation	  runs	  in	  the	  other	  direction.	  Reasons	  are	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  correct	  reasoning,	  rather	  than	  vice	  versa.	  The	  crucial	  thought	  is	  that	  there	  are	  certain	  standards	  of	  correct	  reasoning.	  Possible	  candidates	  for	  such	  standards	  are	  (narrow-­‐scope	  and/or	  wide-­‐scope)	  
requirements	  of	  rationality;	  rules	  of	  deliberation;	  and	  substantive	  norms	  that	  are	  composed	  of	  certain	  reasons.16	  Truths	  about	  reasons	  are	  then	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  correct	  reasoning,	  that	  is,	  reasoning	  that	  satisfies	  standards	  of	  correctness	  that	  are	  prior	  to	  and	  independent	  of	  reasons	  of	  the	  kind	  that	  are	  being	  explained.	  Call	  this	  the	  correct	  reasoning	  characterization	  of	  constructivism.	  Notice	  that	  this	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  the	  standards	  of	  correctness	  must	  be	  prior	  to	  and	  independent	  of	  reasons	  of	  any	  kind.	  For	  example,	  Scanlon’s	  contractualist	  constructivism	  purports	  to	  explain	  truths	  about	  what	  we	  owe	  to	  each	  other	  in	  terms	  of	  correct	  reasoning	  that	  involves	  a	  special	  kind	  of	  action	  and	  that	  is	  regulated	  by	  a	  special	  kind	  of	  aim	  (roughly,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  When	  desires	  figure	  prominently	  in	  constructivist	  views,	  such	  as	  Gauthier’s	  (1986),	  these	  views	  are	  constructivist	  only	  insofar	  as	  and	  because	  of	  the	  role	  the	  desires	  play	  in	  a	  certain	  account	  of	  correct	  reasoning.	  16	  John	  Broome	  (2013)	  has	  recently	  argued	  that	  it	  is	  mistake	  to	  suppose	  that	  reasoning	  is	  made	  correct	  by	  requirements	  of	  rationality	  or	  substantive	  norms.	  Rather,	  according	  to	  Broome,	  reasoning	  is	  made	  correct	  by	  what	  he	  calls	  “basing	  permissions	  of	  rationality.”	  Basing	  permissions	  permit	  us	  to	  form	  some	  attitude(s)	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  some	  (other)	  attitude(s)	  (Broome	  2013,	  p.	  190).	  According	  to	  Broome,	  “a	  correct	  rule	  [of	  reasoning]	  is	  one	  that	  corresponds	  to	  a	  [valid]	  basing	  permission	  of	  rationality”	  (Broome	  2013,	  p.	  255).	  For	  discussion,	  see	  Southwood	  forthcoming	  a.	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living	  together	  with	  others	  on	  terms	  that	  no	  one	  could	  reasonably	  reject).	  According	  to	  Scanlon,	  the	  standards	  of	  correctness	  here	  are	  certain	  substantive	  norms	  that	  are	  composed	  of	  certain	  relevant	  reasons.	  So	  what	  it	  takes	  for	  reasoning	  of	  this	  special	  kind	  to	  be	  correct	  is	  precisely	  a	  matter	  of	  being	  appropriately	  responsive	  to	  this	  class	  of	  reasons.	  Nonetheless,	  Scanlon	  is	  insistent	  that	  the	  correctness	  of	  reasoning	  of	  this	  kind	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  being	  responsive	  to	  truths	  of	  the	  kind	  that	  are	  being	  explained:	  namely,	  truths	  about	  what	  we	  owe	  to	  each	  other.	  Being	  a	  constructivist	  about	  what	  we	  owe	  to	  each	  other,	  Scanlon	  holds	  that	  there	  are	  no	  truths	  about	  what	  we	  owe	  to	  each	  other	  that	  are	  prior	  to	  and	  independent	  of	  correct	  reasoning	  about	  how	  to	  live	  with	  one	  another	  on	  terms	  that	  no	  one	  could	  reasonably	  reject.	  Rather,	  truths	  about	  what	  we	  owe	  to	  each	  other	  are	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  correct	  reasoning	  of	  this	  special	  kind.	  Something	  very	  much	  like	  the	  correct	  reasoning	  characterization	  is,	  in	  fact,	  suggested	  by	  Street.	  She	  writes,	  “one	  way	  to	  present	  …	  constructivism	  is	  as	  claiming	  that	  normative	  facts	  are	  constituted	  by	  facts	  about	  what	  is	  entailed	  by	  the	  ‘rules	  of	  …	  reason’	  in	  combination	  with	  the	  non-­‐normative	  facts.	  The	  trick,	  of	  course,	  is	  to	  give	  a	  plausible	  account	  of	  the	  ‘rules	  of	  …	  reason’”	  (Street	  2010,	  373).	  What	  is	  interesting	  is	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  evaluative	  standpoint	  doesn’t	  figure	  here	  at	  all.	  To	  be	  sure,	  it’s	  lurking	  in	  the	  background.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  Street	  herself	  happens	  to	  endorse	  the	  view	  that	  the	  rules	  or	  requirements	  in	  virtue	  of	  which	  reasoning	  is	  correct	  are	  constitutive	  of	  the	  attitudes	  that	  comprise	  the	  evaluative	  standpoint.	  But	  this	  is	  a	  further	  commitment,	  which	  we	  needn’t	  accept	  simply	  in	  virtue	  of	  accepting	  the	  more	  general	  idea	  that	  truths	  about	  reasons	  are	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  correct	  reasoning.	  One	  nice	  thing	  about	  the	  correct	  reasoning	  characterization	  is	  that	  it	  is	  perfectly	  compatible	  with	  versions	  of	  constructivism	  that	  assign	  a	  central	  role	  to	  either	  procedures	  or	  standpoints.	  Both,	  in	  their	  different	  ways,	  can	  be	  understood	  to	  be	  purporting	  to	  identify	  what	  explains	  truths	  about	  reasons	  in	  terms	  of	  correct	  reasoning:	  proceduralist	  accounts	  in	  terms	  of	  actual	  or	  hypothetical	  procedures	  that	  exemplify	  or	  model	  correct	  reasoning;	  standpoint	  accounts	  in	  terms	  of	  (evaluative)	  standpoints	  from	  within	  which	  certain	  things	  are	  entailed	  in	  combination	  with	  narrow-­‐scope	  requirements	  of	  rationality.	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  Yet	  the	  correct	  reasoning	  characterization	  also	  nicely	  dodges	  the	  problems	  of	  the	  proceduralist	  and	  standpoint	  characterizations.	  The	  main	  problem	  with	  the	  proceduralist	  characterization	  is	  that	  it	  excludes	  those	  versions	  of	  constructivism,	  such	  as	  Rawls’s,	  for	  which	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  procedure	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  mere	  heuristic,	  rather	  than	  what	  is	  really	  explaining	  truths	  about	  reasons.	  According	  to	  the	  correct	  reasoning	  characterization,	  we	  should	  understand	  Rawls’s	  constructivism	  as	  holding	  that	  truths	  about	  social	  justice	  are	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  is	  rationally	  required	  of	  anyone	  who	  accepts	  certain	  liberal	  democratic	  substantive	  norms.	  The	  function	  of	  the	  original	  position	  is	  simply	  to	  render	  vivid	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  reasoning	  from	  liberal	  democratic	  premises.	  The	  correct	  reasoning	  characterization	  also	  avoids	  the	  problems	  of	  the	  standpoint	  characterization.	  One	  problem	  with	  the	  standpoint	  characterization	  is	  that	  it	  excludes	  a	  number	  of	  versions	  of	  constructivism:	  versions	  that	  try	  to	  explain	  truths	  about	  reasons	  in	  terms	  of	  non-­‐evaluative	  attitudes;	  or	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  plurality	  of	  standpoints;	  or	  in	  terms	  of	  rules	  of	  deliberation;	  or	  in	  terms	  of	  wide-­‐scope	  requirements	  of	  rationality;	  or	  that	  deny	  that	  standards	  of	  correct	  reasoning	  are	  constitutive	  of	  the	  attitude	  of	  valuing	  as	  such.	  Even	  if	  it	  can	  be	  modified	  to	  deal	  with	  some	  of	  these	  exclusions,	  it	  cannot	  deal	  with	  them	  all.	  By	  contrast,	  the	  correct	  reasoning	  characterization	  is	  perfectly	  compatible	  with	  these	  versions	  of	  constructivism.	  The	  other	  problem	  with	  the	  standpoint	  characterization	  is	  that	  it	  fails	  to	  explain	  the	  distinctive	  role	  that	  constructivists	  hold	  that	  the	  faculty	  of	  reason	  plays	  in	  the	  determination	  of	  truths	  about	  reasons.	  By	  contrast,	  the	  faculty	  of	  reason	  –	  in	  particular,	  its	  correct	  exercise	  –	  occupies	  centre-­‐stage	  within	  the	  correct	  reasoning	  characterization.	  The	  correct	  reasoning	  characterization,	  then,	  seems	  to	  do	  a	  good	  job	  of	  accommodating	  the	  many	  different	  versions	  of	  constructivism	  and	  explaining	  what	  they	  have	  in	  common	  as	  well	  as	  explaining	  what	  makes	  such	  views	  distinctive.	  Can	  it	  also	  explain	  what	  makes	  constructivism	  a	  prima	  facie	  appealing	  view?	  It	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  it	  can.	  Constructivism	  is	  prima	  facie	  appealing	  inasmuch	  as	  it	  promises	  to	  offer	  a	  vindicating	  explanation	  of	  truths	  about	  reasons	  that	  largely	  eschews	  controversial	  metaphysical	  and	  normative	  assumptions.	  Thus,	  unlike	  views	  that	  simply	  take	  truths	  about	  reasons	  as	  brute	  and	  primitive,	  it	  promises	  to	  identify	  what	  explains	  these	  truths.	  Unlike	  views	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that	  explain	  truths	  about	  reasons	  in	  terms	  of	  normatively	  questionable	  phenomena	  such	  as	  contingent	  social	  practices	  or	  desires,	  it	  promises	  to	  provide	  a	  vindicating	  explanation,	  since	  it	  identifies	  what	  explains	  truths	  about	  reason	  in	  terms	  of	  correct	  reasoning.	  Unlike	  views	  that	  postulate	  metaphysically	  suspect	  entities,	  such	  as	  God	  or	  intrinsic	  value	  or	  a	  domain	  of	  irreducible	  non-­‐natural	  facts,	  it	  promises	  to	  make	  do	  with	  a	  relatively	  metaphysically	  modest	  tool-­‐kit.17	  And,	  unlike	  views	  that	  try	  to	  explain	  truths	  about	  reasons	  in	  terms	  of	  very	  specific	  reasons	  or	  values,	  it	  promises	  to	  explain	  truths	  about	  reasons	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  compatible	  with	  rather	  different	  normative	  starting	  points.18	  So	  it	  seems	  that	  we	  have	  arrived	  at	  a	  more	  satisfactory	  characterization	  of	  constructivism.	  Constructivism	  is	  the	  view	  that	  truths	  about	  reasons	  are	  somehow	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  correct	  reasoning.	  This	  characterization,	  like	  its	  rivals,	  the	  proceduralist	  and	  standpoint	  characterizations,	  is,	  of	  course,	  a	  schema	  that	  can	  be	  (and	  has	  been)	  filled	  in	  many	  different	  ways.	  We	  noted	  in	  section	  2	  that	  there	  are	  different	  kinds	  of	  constructivism.	  There	  are	  also,	  as	  I	  shall	  put	  it,	  different	  versions	  of	  constructivism.	  Versions	  of	  constructivism	  differ,	  in	  particular,	  in	  terms	  of	  certain	  features	  of	  the	  standards	  of	  correctness	  that	  are	  adduced	  to	  explain	  truths	  about	  reasons	  –	  in	  particular,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  category,	  
nature	  and	  content	  of	  those	  standards.	  First,	  they	  differ	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  category	  of	  standards	  of	  correctness.	  Are	  they	  requirements	  of	  rationality,	  rules	  of	  deliberation,	  or	  substantive	  norms?	  Call	  the	  ensuing	  versions	  of	  constructivism	  rationalist,	  deliberative	  and	  substantive	  versions	  of	  constructivism,	  respectively.	  Street	  (2008)	  is	  clearly	  a	  rationalist	  constructivism.	  So	  too	  is	  Gauthier	  (1986).	  Many	  other	  constructivists	  (most	  obviously	  Habermas	  (1984-­‐1987)	  but	  perhaps	  also	  Korsgaard	  (1996a))	  are	  arguably	  best	  thought	  of	  as	  deliberative	  constructivists	  since	  they	  hold	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  How	  about	  those	  versions	  of	  constructivism	  such	  as	  Scanlon’s	  that	  are	  combined	  with	  a	  non-­‐naturalist	  account	  of	  reasons?	  It	  is	  certainly	  not	  true	  that	  this	  combination	  of	  views	  avoids	  postulating	  metaphysically	  suspect	  entities.	  But,	  as	  Scanlon	  repeatedly	  emphasises,	  his	  constructivist	  account	  of	  morality	  (or	  what	  we	  owe	  to	  each	  other)	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  accepting	  non-­‐naturalism	  (or	  indeed	  any	  particular	  view)	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  reasons.	  The	  point	  is	  that	  there	  is	  nothing	  metaphysically	  suspect	  about	  Scanlon’s	  constructivism	  in	  particular.	  I	  am	  grateful	  to	  Daniel	  Star	  for	  forcing	  me	  to	  clarify	  this	  point.	  18	  This	  is	  true	  even	  of	  those	  versions	  of	  constructivism	  such	  as	  Rawls’s	  that	  purport	  to	  explain	  truths	  about	  social	  justice	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  is	  rationally	  required	  of	  anyone	  who	  accepts	  certain	  liberal	  democratic	  substantive	  norms.	  The	  point	  is	  that	  a	  commitment	  to	  liberal	  democracy	  is	  compatible	  with	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  other	  normative	  convictions.	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truths	  about	  reasons	  are	  to	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  rules	  of	  deliberation.	  Scanlon	  (1998),	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  is	  a	  substantive	  constructivist	  since	  he	  holds	  that	  truths	  about	  what	  we	  owe	  to	  each	  other	  are	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  principles	  could	  be	  reasonably	  rejected,	  where	  the	  reasonable	  rejectability	  of	  a	  principle	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  the	  comparative	  weight	  of	  certain	  relevant	  reasons:	  roughly,	  reasons	  that	  are	  compatible	  with	  respecting	  the	  status	  of	  oneself	  and	  others	  as	  autonomous	  agents.	  Second,	  versions	  of	  constructivism	  differ	  in	  terms	  of	  which	  particular	  
standards	  of	  correctness	  (within	  the	  relevant	  category)	  are	  supposed	  to	  explain	  truths	  about	  reasons.	  One	  important	  contrast	  is	  between	  those	  versions	  of	  constructivism	  that	  hold	  that	  the	  single	  valid	  standard	  of	  correctness	  is	  some	  kind	  of	  means-­‐ends	  rule	  or	  requirement	  and	  those	  that	  also	  adduce	  requirements	  that	  make	  demands	  on	  our	  ends.	  Since	  these	  two	  versions	  of	  constructivism	  are	  most	  famously	  associated	  with	  Hobbes	  and	  Kant,	  respectively,	  we	  might	  call	  them	  “Hobbesian”	  and	  “Kantian”	  constructivism,	  respectively.	  That	  is	  fine,	  so	  long	  as	  we	  recognize	  that	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  one	  might	  be	  a	  “Kantian”	  in	  this	  sense.19	  One	  is	  to	  insist	  that	  the	  categorical	  imperative	  is	  a	  valid	  requirement	  of	  rationality	  or	  rule	  of	  deliberation,	  as	  Kant	  and	  his	  descendants	  do	  (see	  Kant	  1998;	  Korsgaard	  1996a;	  O’Neill	  1989).	  Another	  is	  to	  be	  a	  substantive	  constructivist	  (see	  Scanlon	  1998).	  Yet	  another	  is	  to	  adduce	  other	  not-­‐purely-­‐instrumental	  requirements,	  such	  as	  requirements	  of	  deliberative	  reciprocity	  (see	  Southwood	  2010,	  ch.	  4).	  Third,	  versions	  of	  constructivism	  also	  differ	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  relevant	  standards	  of	  correctness.	  Some	  constructivists,	  such	  as	  Gauthier	  (1986),	  appear	  to	  be	  naturalist	  constructivists	  since	  they	  are	  naturalists	  about	  the	  relevant	  standards	  of	  correctness.	  Scanlon	  (1998,	  ch.	  1)	  is	  a	  non-­‐naturalist	  
constructivist	  since	  he	  endorses	  a	  non-­‐naturalistic	  view	  of	  the	  substantive	  norms	  that	  he	  takes	  to	  explain	  truths	  about	  what	  we	  owe	  to	  each	  other.	  Street	  (2010)	  and	  Korsgaard	  (1996a)	  are	  constitutivist	  constructivists	  since	  they	  hold	  that	  the	  relevant	  standards	  of	  correctness	  are	  constitutive	  of	  the	  attitude	  of	  valuing.	  Aaron	  James	  (2012)	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  pragmatist	  constructivist,	  who	  holds	  that	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  only	  way	  in	  which	  these	  labels	  get	  used.	  For	  a	  quite	  different	  way	  of	  using	  the	  “Kantian”	  and	  “Hobbesian”	  (or	  “Humean”)	  labels,	  see	  Street	  (2010,	  pp.	  369-­‐70).	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relevant	  standards	  of	  correctness	  are	  inherent	  in	  the	  social	  practices	  of	  the	  liberal	  democratic	  state.	  Many	  other	  constructivists	  (e.g.	  Rawls	  1980)	  are	  silent	  on	  the	  issue.	  The	  point	  is,	  then,	  that	  just	  as	  there	  are	  many	  different	  kinds	  of	  constructivism,	  so	  too	  are	  there	  many	  different	  versions.	  Having	  arrived	  at	  a	  more	  satisfactory	  understanding	  of	  constructivism,	  let	  us	  say	  something	  about	  how	  this	  might	  help	  us	  in	  the	  evaluation	  of	  constructivism.	  	  5.	  Evaluating	  constructivism	  I	  have	  offered	  a	  way	  of	  understanding	  constructivism	  –	  in	  general	  and	  in	  its	  many	  different	  forms.	  In	  conclusion,	  I	  want	  to	  say	  something	  about	  the	  implications	  of	  understanding	  constructivism	  in	  this	  way	  for	  the	  project	  of	  
evaluating	  constructivism.	  I	  shall	  suggest	  that	  doing	  so	  shows	  that	  certain	  challenges	  that	  have	  been	  raised	  against	  constructivist	  theories	  miss	  the	  mark.	  It	  also	  makes	  certain	  other	  challenges	  especially	  pressing	  and	  vivid.	  I	  will	  structure	  my	  remarks	  by	  considering	  the	  three	  salient	  kinds	  of	  constructivism	  that	  we	  encountered	  in	  section	  2.	  	  
5.1.	  Local	  normative	  constructivism	  Let’s	  start	  with	  local	  normative	  constructivism.	  According	  to	  the	  correct	  reasoning	  characterization,	  this	  holds	  that	  certain	  standards	  of	  correct	  reasoning	  
normatively	  explain	  or	  ground	  certain	  truths	  about	  reasons	  (say,	  truths	  about	  morality	  or	  social	  justice).	  Since	  it	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  normative	  constructivism,	  the	  explanation	  that	  it	  purports	  to	  identify	  of	  truths	  about	  the	  relevant	  reasons	  must	  appeal	  to	  other	  truths	  about	  reasons.	  Since	  it	  is	  a	  local	  kind	  of	  normative	  constructivism,	  the	  explanation	  must	  appeal	  to	  truths	  about	  the	  same	  kinds	  of	  
reasons	  as	  those	  that	  it	  purports	  to	  explain.	  So,	  for	  example,	  local	  normative	  constructivism	  about	  morality	  holds	  that	  the	  explanation	  of	  moral	  requirements	  lies	  with	  some	  more	  general	  moral	  requirement	  involving	  standards	  of	  correct	  reasoning.	  That	  is,	  we	  are	  morally	  required	  to	  perform	  the	  acts	  that	  we	  are	  morally	  required	  to	  perform	  because	  we	  are	  morally	  required	  to,	  say,	  comply	  with	  relevant	  substantive	  norms,	  or	  comply	  with	  principles	  to	  which	  we	  would	  agree	  if	  we	  fully	  complied	  with	  relevant	  requirements	  of	  rationality,	  or	  whatever.	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Notice	  that	  this	  way	  of	  understanding	  local	  normative	  constructivism	  allows	  us	  to	  see	  immediately	  that	  certain	  objections	  that	  are	  commonly	  raised	  against	  it	  are	  thoroughly	  misguided.	  For	  example,	  a	  common	  objection	  to	  Rawls’s	  theory	  is	  that	  it	  is	  implausible	  because,	  while	  we	  have	  reason	  to	  respect	  actual	  agreements,	  it’s	  not	  true	  that	  we	  have	  reason	  to	  respect	  merely	  hypothetical	  agreements.	  As	  Ronald	  Dworkin	  famously	  put	  it,	  Rawls’s	  “contract	  is	  hypothetical,	  and	  hypothetical	  contracts	  do	  not	  supply	  an	  independent	  argument	  for	  the	  fairness	  of	  enforcing	  their	  terms.	  A	  hypothetical	  contract	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  pale	  form	  of	  an	  actual	  contract;	  it	  is	  no	  contract	  at	  all”	  (Dworkin	  1975,	  pp.	  17-­‐18;	  Hampton	  1986,	  p.	  268;	  Kavka	  1986,	  p.	  399).	  Perhaps	  this	  is	  a	  good	  objection	  to	  local	  normative	  constructivism	  according	  to	  the	  proceduralist	  characterization	  (though	  see	  Southwood	  2010,	  pp.	  134-­‐5).	  But	  it’s	  not	  a	  good	  objection	  to	  local	  normative	  constructivism	  according	  to	  the	  correct	  reasoning	  characterization.	  Thus	  characterized,	  local	  normative	  constructivism	  about	  social	  justice	  explains	  truths	  about	  social	  justice	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  more	  general	  requirement	  of	  justice	  involving	  standards	  of	  correct	  reasoning.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Rawls’s	  theory,	  this	  is	  something	  like	  a	  general	  requirement	  to	  reason	  in	  a	  certain	  way	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  certain	  liberal	  democratic	  premises.	  The	  general	  requirement	  to	  which	  Rawls	  appeals	  isn’t	  a	  requirement	  to	  respect	  some	  hypothetical	  contract	  or	  agreement,	  but	  a	  requirement	  to	  treat	  others	  in	  certain	  ways.	  Another	  common	  objection	  to	  constructivist	  theories	  such	  as	  Rawls’s	  is	  that	  they	  appeal	  to	  truths	  about	  social	  justice	  or	  morality	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  truths	  about	  social	  justice	  or	  morality.	  For	  example,	  Robert	  Goodin	  (1993,	  p.	  117)	  accuses	  a	  whole	  range	  of	  philosophers	  of	  “smuggling	  moral	  assumptions	  into	  the	  premises	  of	  [their]	  argument[s]	  for	  morality.	  …	  Certainly	  John	  Rawls’s	  theory	  of	  justice,	  for	  example,	  is	  guilty	  of	  the	  same	  sin.”	  But	  this	  is	  a	  rather	  odd	  objection	  to	  local	  normative	  constructivism.20	  Local	  normative	  constructivism	  just	  is	  the	  view	  that	  truths	  about	  reasons	  of	  the	  kind	  that	  are	  being	  explained	  are	  also	  doing	  the	  explaining.	  If	  it	  didn’t	  appeal	  to	  such	  truths,	  then	  it	  wouldn’t	  be	  a	  version	  of	  local	  normative	  constructivism.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  In	  fairness	  to	  Goodin,	  his	  principal	  target	  in	  the	  article	  is	  David	  Gauthier,	  who	  is	  not	  a	  local	  normative	  constructivist.	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These	  are	  just	  two	  examples	  of	  how	  getting	  clear	  about	  what	  constructivism	  is	  can	  help	  us	  avoid	  being	  seduced	  by	  irrelevant	  objections.	  As	  flagged	  above,	  a	  proper	  understanding	  of	  constructivism	  can	  also	  direct	  our	  attention	  towards	  the	  real	  challenges	  facing	  constructivism.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  local	  normative	  constructivism,	  it	  should	  be	  clear	  that	  the	  central	  challenge	  is	  to	  come	  up	  with	  a	  theory	  that	  is	  both	  substantively	  plausible	  and	  explanatory.	  That	  is,	  it	  must	  identify	  some	  reason	  of	  the	  relevant	  kind	  involving	  standards	  of	  correct	  reasoning	  such	  that	  1)	  we	  really	  have	  that	  reason	  and	  2)	  the	  reason	  is	  really	  explaining	  why	  we	  have	  the	  other	  reasons	  (of	  that	  kind)	  that	  we	  do.	  For	  example,	  a	  local	  normative	  constructivist	  account	  of	  morality	  must	  identify	  some	  moral	  requirement	  involving	  standards	  of	  correct	  reasoning	  such	  that	  1*)	  we	  are	  really	  subject	  to	  the	  moral	  requirement	  and	  2*)	  the	  moral	  requirement	  is	  really	  explaining	  why	  we	  are	  subject	  to	  the	  other	  moral	  requirements	  to	  which	  we	  are	  subject.	  It	  is	  relatively	  easy	  to	  come	  up	  with	  an	  account	  that	  is	  substantively	  plausible	  but	  unexplanatory,	  or	  that	  would	  be	  explanatory	  but	  is	  substantively	  implausible.	  But	  it	  is	  anything	  but	  easy	  to	  come	  up	  with	  a	  theory	  that	  is	  both	  substantively	  plausible	  and	  genuinely	  explanatory.	  As	  an	  example	  of	  a	  theory	  that	  seems	  substantively	  plausible	  but	  unexplanatory,	  consider	  a	  local	  normative	  constructivist	  interpretation	  of	  Scanlon’s	  contractualism.21	  This	  would	  hold,	  roughly,	  that	  we	  are	  morally	  required	  to	  perform	  the	  acts	  that	  we	  are	  morally	  required	  to	  perform	  because	  we	  are	  morally	  required	  to	  comply	  with	  principles	  to	  which	  no	  one	  could	  reasonably	  object.	  It	  is	  pretty	  plausible,	  it	  seems	  to	  me,	  that	  we	  are	  subject	  to	  such	  a	  moral	  requirement.	  But	  it	  is	  far	  less	  plausible	  that	  this	  explains	  why	  we	  are	  morally	  required	  to,	  say,	  refrain	  from	  breaking	  into	  one’s	  neighbor’s	  house	  and	  murdering	  him	  in	  his	  bed.	  As	  an	  example	  of	  a	  theory	  that	  would	  be	  explanatory	  but	  is	  substantively	  implausible,	  consider	  a	  local	  normative	  constructivist	  interpretation	  of	  Gauthier’s	  contractarianism.22	  This	  would	  hold,	  roughly,	  that	  we	  are	  morally	  required	  to	  perform	  the	  acts	  that	  we	  are	  morally	  required	  to	  perform	  because	  we	  are	  morally	  required	  to	  comply	  with	  principles	  to	  which	  it	  would	  be	  instrumentally	  rational	  for	  a	  majority	  of	  us	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  It	  must	  be	  emphasized	  that	  Scanlon	  himself	  forcibly	  repudiates	  this	  interpretation	  of	  his	  contractualism	  (see	  Scanlon	  1998,	  p.	  391,	  n.	  21).	  22	  Again,	  this	  is	  almost	  certainly	  an	  implausible	  interpretation	  of	  what	  Gauthier	  actually	  says.	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agree.	  If	  it	  were	  true	  that	  we	  are	  subject	  to	  such	  a	  moral	  requirement,	  it	  would	  be	  potentially	  highly	  explanatory.	  But	  it	  seems	  plainly	  false.	  The	  principles	  to	  which	  it	  would	  be	  instrumentally	  rational	  for	  a	  majority	  of	  us	  to	  agree	  will	  be	  a	  function	  of	  contingent	  facts	  about	  our	  desires.	  If	  these	  desires	  are	  nasty	  enough,	  then	  it	  will	  be,	  not	  only	  not	  morally	  required,	  by	  morally	  impermissible	  for	  us	  to	  comply	  with	  such	  principles.	  Herein	  lies	  the	  real	  challenge	  to	  local	  normative	  constructivism.	  	  
5.2.	  Local	  constitutive	  constructivism	  Next,	  consider	  local	  constitutive	  constructivism.	  According	  to	  the	  correct	  reasoning	  characterization,	  this	  holds	  that	  certain	  standards	  of	  correct	  reasoning	  constitutively	  explain	  certain	  truths	  about	  reasons	  (say,	  about	  morality	  or	  justice).	  Since	  it	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  constitutive	  constructivism,	  the	  explanation	  of	  the	  relevant	  truths	  about	  reasons	  cannot	  itself	  appeal	  to	  truths	  of	  the	  kind	  that	  are	  being	  explained.	  So,	  for	  example,	  the	  explanation	  of,	  say,	  truths	  about	  morality	  cannot	  itself	  appeal	  to	  moral	  truths.	  Otherwise,	  it	  would	  fail	  to	  be	  an	  account	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  moral	  truths,	  of	  what	  moral	  truths	  consist	  in.	  However,	  since	  it	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  local	  rather	  than	  global	  constructivism,	  it	  can	  appeal	  to	  other	  kinds	  of	  reasons.	  Thus,	  there	  is	  no	  impediment	  to	  adducing	  substantive	  norms	  in	  the	  explanation	  of	  reasons	  of	  the	  relevant	  kind.	  Again,	  notice	  that	  this	  way	  of	  understanding	  local	  constitutive	  constructivism	  immediately	  makes	  clear	  what	  is	  wrong	  with	  certain	  common	  objections	  to	  it.	  For	  example,	  there	  is	  the	  so-­‐called	  “redundancy”	  or	  “epiphenomenal	  objection”	  to	  Scanlon’s	  contractualism,	  which	  holds	  that	  the	  putative	  explanans	  (i.e.	  the	  contractual	  apparatus)	  is	  really	  an	  explanatorily	  inert	  by-­‐product	  of	  what	  is	  really	  explaining	  truths	  about	  morality,	  namely,	  truths	  about	  relevant	  reasons.	  As	  Philip	  Pettit	  (1993,	  p.	  302)	  puts	  it,	  “It	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  why	  we	  do	  not	  take	  the	  right-­‐making	  property	  …	  to	  be	  the	  non-­‐hypothetical	  property	  which	  recommends	  itself	  to	  the	  contractors.	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  why	  we	  should	  ignore	  that	  property	  and	  focus	  instead	  on	  the	  hypothetical	  property.”	  Similarly,	  Simon	  Blackburn	  (1999)	  writes,	  “Suppose	  that	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  reject	  my	  principles	  because,	  for	  instance,	  they	  lead	  to	  vast	  inequalities	  of	  wealth.	  Why	  then	  isn't	  this	  the	  very	  feature	  that	  makes	  my	  principles	  wrong?	  Why	  go	  through	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the	  detour	  of	  dragging	  in	  the	  hypothetical	  agreement	  with	  others?”	  This	  objection	  seems	  to	  be	  presupposing	  the	  proceduralist	  characterization	  –	  that	  Scanlon	  is	  trying	  to	  explain	  truths	  about	  morality	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  outcome	  of	  some	  kind	  of	  hypothetical	  procedure.23	  But,	  as	  the	  correct	  reasoning	  characterization	  nicely	  brings	  out,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  core	  of	  his	  constructivist	  account	  of	  morality.	  Rather,	  what	  is	  central	  are	  certain	  substantive	  norms	  in	  virtue	  of	  which	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  reasoning	  is	  correct	  and	  which	  are,	  in	  effect,	  simply	  candidate	  truths	  about	  the	  comparative	  weight	  of	  relevant	  reasons.	  Another	  related	  objection	  to	  Scanlon’s	  theory	  is	  that	  it	  offers	  a	  substantively	  implausible	  account	  of	  what	  explains	  truths	  about	  morality.	  For	  example,	  Colin	  McGinn	  (1999,	  p.	  36)	  writes:	  	   Why	  is	  it	  wrong	  to	  cause	  unnecessary	  pain	  to	  infants	  and	  animals?	  Is	  it	  because	  they	  could	  reasonably	  object	  to	  such	  treatment?	  Hardly.	  …	  Surely,	  the	  reason	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  cause	  non-­‐rational	  beings	  pain	  is	  that	  pain	  is	  a	  bad	  thing,	  and	  hence	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  cause	  it	  for	  no	  good	  reason.	  	  This	  objection	  also	  completely	  misses	  the	  mark.	  Constitutive	  constructivists	  aren’t	  trying	  to	  answer	  the	  question,	  “Why	  is	  it	  wrong	  to	  cause	  unnecessary	  pain	  to	  infants	  and	  animals?”	  That’s	  what	  normative	  constructivists	  are	  up	  to.	  Rather,	  they	  are	  in	  the	  business	  of	  answering	  a	  quite	  different	  question,	  namely,	  “What	  do	  truths	  about	  morality	  consist	  in?”	  The	  real	  challenge	  for	  local	  constitutive	  constructivism,	  I	  believe,	  is	  to	  come	  up	  with	  an	  account	  of	  the	  standards	  of	  correct	  reasoning	  that	  can	  do	  two	  things	  (see	  Southwood	  2010,	  pp.	  12-­‐22).	  First,	  it	  must	  be	  sufficiently	  faithful	  to	  certain	  core	  properties	  possessed	  by	  truths	  about	  reasons	  of	  the	  kind	  that	  are	  being	  explained.	  For	  example,	  truths	  about	  morality	  are	  plausibly	  thought	  to	  possess	  a	  special	  impartiality,	  authority,	  universality,	  and	  other-­‐regardingness.	  If	  this	  is	  right,	  an	  account	  of	  what	  constitutively	  explains	  truths	  about	  morality	  must,	  therefore,	  be	  sufficiently	  faithful	  to	  these	  properties.	  Second,	  it	  must	  be	  genuinely	  explanatory	  with	  respect	  to	  truths	  about	  reasons	  of	  the	  relevant	  kind	  (see	  Southwood	  2010,	  ch.	  7).	  Thus,	  it	  must	  get	  the	  order	  of	  explanation	  right;	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Like	  McGinn’s	  objection	  discussed	  below,	  it	  also	  seems	  to	  be	  presupposing	  that	  Scanlon’s	  view	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  normative	  constructivism	  (see	  Stratton-­‐Lake	  2003a;	  2003b).	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truths	  about	  the	  relevant	  reasons	  must	  be	  constitutively	  explained	  by	  truths	  about	  standards	  of	  correct	  reasoning,	  rather	  than	  vice	  versa.	  It	  must	  be	  non-­‐circular;	  it	  must	  not	  presuppose	  what	  it	  purports	  to	  explain.	  And	  so	  on.	  I	  have	  myself	  argued	  elsewhere	  that	  the	  main	  existing	  “Hobbesian”	  and	  “Kantian”	  versions	  of	  local	  constitutive	  constructivism	  about	  morality	  are	  poorly	  equipped	  to	  satisfy	  both	  criteria;	  and	  that	  we	  need	  a	  radically	  different,	  “deliberative”	  kind	  of	  constructivist	  theory	  (Southwood	  2010).	  The	  problem	  with	  Hobbesian	  views	  is	  that	  the	  thin	  instrumentalist	  specification	  of	  the	  standards	  of	  correct	  reasoning	  means	  that	  they	  are	  not	  sufficiently	  faithful	  to	  morality’s	  impartiality,	  authority	  and	  other-­‐regardiness	  (Southwood	  2010,	  ch.	  2).	  The	  problem	  with	  at	  least	  the	  most	  popular	  Kantian	  views	  is	  that	  the	  thick	  and	  substantive	  specification	  of	  the	  standards	  of	  correct	  reasoning	  means	  that	  they	  aren’t	  genuinely	  explanatory	  with	  respect	  to	  truths	  about	  morality.	  Rather,	  they	  presuppose	  moral	  considerations	  in	  at	  least	  two	  places:	  in	  the	  determination	  of	  relevant	  reasons;	  and	  in	  the	  determination	  of	  the	  comparative	  weight	  of	  relevant	  reasons	  (Southwood	  2010,	  ch.	  3).	  The	  problem,	  in	  each	  case,	  is	  that	  without	  importing	  substantive	  moral	  assumptions	  the	  notion	  of	  reasonableness	  simply	  lacks	  sufficiently	  determinate	  content	  to	  generate	  plausible	  first-­‐order	  moral	  truths.	  By	  contrast,	  deliberative	  contractualism,	  which	  is	  based	  on	  a	  conception	  of	  practical	  reason	  that	  is	  procedural	  yet	  normatively	  rich,	  is	  better	  placed	  to	  capture	  morality’s	  impartiality,	  authority	  and	  other-­‐regardiness	  while	  also	  being	  genuinely	  explanatory.	  Or	  so	  I	  have	  argued	  (see	  Southwood	  2010,	  esp.	  chs.	  6	  and	  7).	  In	  any	  case,	  this	  is	  where	  the	  real	  challenge	  lies	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  local	  constitutive	  constructivism.	  	  
5.3.	  Global	  constitutive	  constructivism	  Finally,	  let	  us	  consider	  global	  constitutive	  constructivism.	  This	  holds	  that	  certain	  standards	  of	  correct	  reasoning	  constitutively	  explain	  all	  truths	  about	  reasons	  (or	  at	  least	  all	  truths	  about	  practical	  reasons).	  Unlike	  the	  other	  versions	  of	  constructivism	  that	  we	  have	  encountered,	  global	  constitutive	  constructivism	  cannot	  appeal	  to	  any	  truths	  about	  reasons	  in	  the	  explanation	  of	  truths	  about	  reasons.	  Otherwise,	  it	  would	  be	  viciously	  circular.	  What	  this	  means,	  then,	  is	  that	  global	  constitutive	  constructivists	  cannot	  adduce	  substantive	  norms	  since	  these	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are	  composed	  of	  reasons.	  Rather,	  they	  must	  adduce	  either	  requirements	  of	  rationality	  or	  rules	  of	  deliberation;	  and	  these	  must	  not	  themselves	  involve	  truths	  about	  reasons.	  In	  these	  respects,	  global	  constitutive	  constructivism	  is	  an	  exceptionally	  ambitious	  form	  of	  constructivism.	  Unsurprisingly,	  it	  faces	  many	  forceful	  challenges	  (see	  e.g.	  Enoch	  2011;	  Hussain	  and	  Shah	  2006;	  Wallace	  2012).	  I	  want	  to	  focus	  here	  on	  two	  formidable	  challenges	  that	  are	  nicely	  brought	  to	  the	  fore	  by	  the	  correct	  reasoning	  characterization.	  The	  first	  results	  from	  a	  familiar	  kind	  of	  substantive	  mismatch	  between	  requirements	  of	  rationality	  and	  rules	  of	  deliberation,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  reasons	  we	  have,	  on	  the	  other.	  Plausibly	  I	  can	  be	  rationally	  required	  to	  (intend	  to)	  put	  arsenic	  in	  your	  coffee	  if	  I	  intend	  to	  kill	  you	  and	  believe	  that	  I	  can	  only	  kill	  you	  by	  putting	  arsenic	  in	  your	  coffee.24	  But	  it	  certainly	  doesn’t	  seem	  to	  follow	  that	  I	  have	  reason	  to	  put	  arsenic	  in	  your	  coffee.	  Similarly,	  if	  I	  deliberate	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  my	  intention	  to	  kill	  you	  and	  my	  belief	  that	  I	  can	  only	  kill	  you	  by	  putting	  arsenic	  in	  your	  coffee	  to	  the	  intention	  to	  put	  arsenic	  in	  your	  coffee,	  then	  it	  seems	  that	  I	  have	  followed	  a	  valid	  rule	  of	  deliberation.	  But,	  again,	  this	  doesn’t	  mean	  that	  I	  have	  any	  reason	  to	  put	  arsenic	  in	  your	  coffee.	  The	  idea	  that	  we	  can	  make	  it	  the	  case	  that	  we	  have	  reasons	  simply	  by	  having	  or	  forming	  certain	  objectionable	  attitudes	  that	  activate	  requirements	  of	  rationality,	  or	  by	  deliberating	  correctly	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  these	  attitudes,	  seems	  to	  be	  to	  countenance	  objectionable	  “bootstrapping”	  (see	  Broome	  1999;	  Kolodny	  2005).	  There	  is	  a	  serious	  worry,	  then,	  that	  global	  constitutive	  constructivists,	  inasmuch	  as	  they	  try	  to	  identify	  what	  explains	  truths	  about	  reasons	  in	  terms	  of	  requirements	  of	  rationality	  or	  rules	  of	  deliberation,	  will	  be	  especially	  susceptible	  to	  such	  bootstrapping.	  There	  are	  two	  main	  kinds	  of	  responses	  to	  this	  worry.	  The	  Kantian	  response	  is	  to	  insist	  that	  the	  standards	  of	  correct	  reasoning	  in	  terms	  of	  which	  truths	  about	  reasons	  are	  constitutively	  explained	  include	  the	  categorical	  imperative	  (see	  Korsgaard	  1996,	  esp.	  lectures	  3	  and	  4).	  The	  categorical	  imperative	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  substantive	  moral	  requirement	  but	  a	  genuine	  requirement	  of	  rationality	  or	  valid	  rule	  of	  deliberation.	  You	  only	  count	  as	  rational,	  or	  engaged	  in	  correct	  deliberation	  (if	  you	  are	  deliberating	  at	  all),	  insofar	  as	  you	  comply	  with	  it.	  The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  This	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  neutral	  concerning	  whether	  the	  requirement	  in	  question	  is	  a	  narrow-­‐scope	  or	  wide-­‐scope	  requirement.	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Hobbesian	  response	  is	  to	  bite	  the	  bullet	  and	  concede	  that	  we	  can	  “bootstrap”	  ourselves	  into	  having	  reasons	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  (what	  seem	  to	  be)	  objectionable	  attitudes	  (see	  Street	  2009;	  2012).	  Neither	  of	  these	  responses	  is	  especially	  compelling.	  It	  is	  highly	  implausible	  to	  suppose	  that	  requirements	  of	  rationality	  or	  rules	  of	  deliberation	  include	  the	  categorical	  imperative.	  Or	  at	  least,	  this	  is	  highly	  implausible	  unless	  we	  assume	  that	  such	  requirements	  or	  rules	  themselves	  somehow	  involve	  reasons,	  in	  which	  case	  global	  constitutive	  constructivism	  will	  be	  viciously	  circular.	  But	  to	  countenance	  bootstrapping	  is	  hopeless	  as	  well.	  It	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  the	  global	  constitutive	  constructivist	  needs	  a	  better	  response.	  While	  there	  isn’t	  space	  to	  develop	  such	  a	  response	  here,	  my	  own	  view	  is	  that	  the	  most	  promising	  line	  of	  response	  will	  involve	  three	  things.	  First,	  it	  will	  avoid	  extravagantly	  ambitious	  requirements	  of	  rationality	  or	  rules	  of	  deliberation	  and	  stick	  to	  a	  relatively	  modest	  set	  of	  such	  requirements	  or	  rules	  (though	  not	  necessarily	  quite	  so	  modest	  as	  Hobbesians	  insist	  upon).	  Second,	  it	  will	  involve	  a	  version	  of	  constructivism	  that	  purports,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  first	  instance,	  to	  explain	  our	  “subjective	  reasons”	  (or,	  as	  I	  prefer	  to	  put	  it,	  “standpoint-­‐relative	  reasons”).	  Standpoint-­‐relative	  reasons	  are	  reasons	  of	  a	  kind	  where	  the	  charge	  of	  objectionable	  bootstrapping	  does	  not	  arise.	  Third,	  it	  will	  involve	  insisting	  that	  so-­‐called	  “objective	  reasons”	  (or	  “standpoint-­‐invariant	  reasons”),	  where	  the	  charge	  of	  bootstrapping	  certainly	  does	  arise,	  are	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  subjective	  (standpoint-­‐relative)	  reasons,	  rather	  than	  vice	  versa,	  but	  in	  a	  way	  that	  “launders”	  out	  the	  features	  that	  generate	  bootstrapping.25	  The	  second	  really	  serious	  challenge	  for	  global	  constitutive	  constructivism	  that	  is	  brought	  to	  the	  fore	  by	  the	  correct	  reasoning	  characterization	  concerns	  the	  
nature	  (in	  particular	  the	  normative	  status)	  of	  the	  standards	  of	  correct	  reasoning.	  Notice	  that,	  according	  to	  the	  standpoint	  characterization	  of	  constructivism,	  we	  get	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  question,	  “What	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  relevant	  standards	  of	  correct	  reasoning?”	  for	  free.	  They	  are	  those	  standards	  that	  are	  constitutive	  of	  the	  attitude	  of	  valuing	  that	  comprises	  the	  evaluative	  standpoint.	  But	  the	  correct	  reasoning	  characterization	  doesn’t	  come	  with	  any	  such	  answer.	  Rather,	  the	  question	  is	  a	  live	  one.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  I	  make	  a	  start	  in	  developing	  such	  an	  account	  in	  Southwood	  forthcoming	  b.	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The	  problem	  is	  that	  the	  natural	  ways	  of	  answering	  the	  question	  make	  constructivism	  collapse	  into	  one	  or	  other	  of	  the	  standard	  meta-­‐ethical	  views	  (see	  Enoch	  2011;	  Ridge	  2012).	  For	  example,	  one	  might	  think	  that	  the	  standards	  of	  correct	  reasoning	  are	  reducible	  to	  natural	  facts	  –	  say,	  certain	  conventions	  or	  social	  practices.	  In	  that	  case,	  constructivism	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  ultimately	  a	  version	  of	  meta-­‐ethical	  naturalism.	  Alternatively,	  one	  might	  think	  that	  the	  standards	  of	  correct	  reasoning	  are	  irreducible,	  sui	  generis	  normative	  requirements.	  In	  that	  case,	  constructivism	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  ultimately	  a	  version	  of	  meta-­‐ethical	  non-­‐naturalism.	  Or,	  again,	  one	  might	  think	  that	  our	  talk	  and	  thought	  involving	  standards	  of	  correct	  reasoning	  can	  ultimately	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  expression	  of	  conative	  attitudes.	  In	  that	  case,	  constructivism	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  ultimately	  a	  version	  of	  meta-­‐ethical	  expressivism.	  Perhaps	  this	  is	  all	  just	  fine.	  Perhaps	  we	  shouldn’t	  ever	  have	  expected	  constructivism	  to	  be	  anything	  other	  than	  a	  particular	  version	  of	  one	  of	  the	  existing	  meta-­‐ethical	  options	  (see	  Lenman	  2012;	  Ridge	  2012).	  At	  least	  some	  constructivists,	  however,	  have	  clearly	  hoped	  for	  more	  (see	  Korsgaard	  1996a;	  Street	  2008).	  Once	  again,	  then,	  global	  constitutive	  constructivists	  here	  confront	  a	  truly	  formidable	  challenge.	  One	  possible	  solution	  to	  this	  challenge	  is	  to	  resort	  again	  to	  
constitutivism	  about	  the	  standards	  of	  correct	  reasoning.	  Constitutivism	  is	  a	  vibrant	  and	  exciting	  research	  program	  (see	  Katsafanas	  this	  volume).	  But	  I	  am	  not	  myself	  optimistic	  that	  it	  is	  up	  to	  the	  task.	  The	  problem,	  to	  my	  mind,	  is	  that	  it	  is	  doubtful	  that	  there	  are	  any	  standpoint-­‐constituting	  demands,	  or	  at	  least	  that	  standards	  of	  correct	  reasoning	  are	  instances	  of	  them	  (see	  Enoch	  2006;	  Southwood	  forthcoming	  b).	  A	  standpoint-­‐constituting	  requirement	  would	  be	  a	  requirement	  such	  that	  you	  don’t	  count	  as	  even	  having	  attitudes	  of	  the	  right	  kind	  unless	  you	  accept	  (Korsgaard	  1996)	  or	  comply	  with	  (Street	  2010)	  the	  requirement.	  But	  it	  seems	  that	  we	  can	  easily	  imagine	  individuals	  who	  don’t	  accept	  or	  comply	  with	  valid	  requirements	  of	  reason	  without	  this	  implying	  that	  they	  lack	  the	  attitudes	  of	  the	  right	  kind.	  My	  own	  view	  is	  that	  we	  should	  look	  elsewhere.	  At	  least	  in	  the	  case	  of	  practical	  reason,	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  best	  response	  will	  involve	  showing	  that	  standards	  of	  correct	  reasoning	  have	  a	  kind	  of	  special	  normative	  status	  that	  is	  somehow	  crucially	  tied	  to	  the	  faculty	  of	  reason,	  rather	  than	  prior	  to	  and	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independent	  of	  it,	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  they	  don’t	  raise	  the	  kinds	  of	  meta-­‐ethical	  puzzles	  to	  which	  constructivism	  was	  supposed	  to	  be	  a	  solution.	  I	  have	  suggested	  elsewhere	  that	  there	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  normative	  status,	  which	  is	  comprised	  of	  what	  I	  have	  called	  truths	  about	  “the	  thing	  to	  do”	  (see	  Southwood	  2016).	  Truths	  about	  the	  thing	  to	  do	  just	  are	  truths	  about	  the	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  that	  practical	  reason	  tries	  to	  answer,	  the	  question	  of	  what	  to	  do.	  If	  this	  is	  right	  –	  a	  very	  big	  “if”	  –	  then	  it	  may	  potentially	  help	  the	  constructivist	  in	  providing	  an	  account	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  standards	  of	  correct	  reasoning	  that	  can	  allow	  her	  to	  forge	  a	  distinctive	  and	  plausible	  meta-­‐ethical	  position.	  The	  idea	  would	  be	  that	  standards	  of	  correct	  reasoning	  are	  or	  involve	  truths	  about	  the	  thing	  to	  do.	  So	  the	  normative	  status	  of	  standards	  of	  correct	  reasoning	  is	  crucially	  tied	  to	  reason	  but	  not,	  as	  the	  constitutivist	  would	  have	  it,	  because	  they	  help	  to	  constitute	  the	  evaluative	  standpoint.	  Rather,	  the	  normative	  status	  of	  standards	  of	  correct	  reasoning	  derives	  from	  their	  telling	  us	  the	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  that	  practical	  reason	  tries	  to	  answer,	  the	  question	  of	  what	  to	  do	  (see	  Southwood	  forthcoming	  b).	  It	  is	  time	  to	  conclude.	  I	  have	  done	  nothing	  more	  here	  than	  gesture	  at	  what	  I	  take	  to	  be	  some	  of	  the	  main	  challenges	  confronting	  constructivism	  and	  some	  possible	  ways	  of	  developing	  responses	  to	  them.	  My	  main	  point	  has	  been	  to	  show	  how	  the	  real	  challenges	  emerge	  and	  are	  brought	  into	  stark	  relief	  once	  we	  have	  a	  more	  satisfactory	  understanding	  of	  constructivism.	  Whether	  the	  challenges	  can	  be	  adequately	  addressed	  is	  a	  large	  topic	  for	  another	  occasion.	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